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ONE FOR A, TWO FOR B, AND FOUR HUNDRED FOR C:
THE WIDENING GAP IN PAY BETWEEN EXECUTIVES
AND RANK AND FILE EMPLOYEES
SusanJ. Stabile*
This Article, focuses on executive pay in relation to that of rank and file workers.
It examines the standard justifications for the vast and increasing pay gap be-
tween executives (particularly CEOs) and rank and file workers and finds that
such arguments do little more than attempt to justify in economic terms a situation
that exists for a very different reason. Instead, the author argues, the real reason
such a huge and widening gap in pay between executive and rank and file work-
ers exists is market failure in the mechanisms of setting executive pay, aggravated
by the shareholder primacy norm, which has resulted in an explosion in the use of
incentive pay to compensate executives.
The Article discusses two reasons why such a pay gap should be viewed negatively.
The first is an economic argument that rests on declines in productivity and other
adverse motivational consequences of employees' perceptions of unfairness. More
importantly, the author argues that vast pay disparities are unacceptable as a
matter of social policy and our notions of distributive justice. In order to address
these concerns, the Article puts forth some suggestions for obtaining a more rea-
sonable relationship between the compensation paid to executives and the pay
received by rank and file employees. Finding it impractical to identify and attempt
to achieve a particular pay ratio, the author argues for an approach that attempts
to introduce more fairness (and perception of fairness) into the compensation set-
ting process.
INTRODUCTION
The compensation disparity between U.S. executives and rank
and file workers is large and growing, corresponding to rising lev-
els of income inequality. In the early 1990s, the pay of corporate
CEOs surged to 120 to 150 times that of rank and file employees,1 a
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; Adjunct Assistant Professor of
Law, New York University School of Law; Research Fellow, NYU Center for Labor and Em-
ployment Law. B.A. 1979, Georgetown University; J.D. 1982, New York University School of
Law. I am grateful to Larry Mitchell and the other participants in the Sloane Foundation
Corporate Law Summer Camp for their helpful comments on the draft version of this Arti-
cle.
1. GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN
EXECUTIVES 27 (1991).
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tremendous increase over the disparity that existed only ten years
2
earlier. During the 1990s, the inequality was aggravated; between
1990 and 2000, CEOs saw their pay rise by more than 500%, while
the pay of the average worker increased less than 40%.3 As a result,
more recent surveys suggest that the average pay of CEOs is any-
where from 475 to 500 times the pay of average employees.
Although much press attention has been focused on the pay of
CEOs, other senior executive officers are also compensated quite
generously in comparison with rank and file workers.5 Even if some
commentators are correct that the gap is overstated,6 it is nonethe-
less large.
2. In 1980, the ratio was 42 to 1. See Tim Smart, Pay Gap Widens Between Workers and
Bosses Explodes, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1999, at A6. The gap has risen steadily since then. See
Daniel Kadlec, How CEO Pay Got Away: Linking the Boss s Check to the Firm's Stock Price Seemed
Reasonable. Then the Market Went Wild, TIME, Apr. 28, 1997, at 59 (noting pay disparity be-
tween CEOs and the rank and file is five times greater than it was thirty years ago and is
growing).
3. See Marcel Kahan, The Limited Signficance of Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 1869, 1884 (2001) (noting that between 1992 and 1998, CEO pay more than
doubled while rank and file worker pay increased by only 20%); David R. Francis, A Post-
Labor Day Look at Pay Gaps and Wage Wars, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 4, 2001, at 21
(indicating that during the 1990-2000 period, top corporate executives' pay rose 571%
while the average workers' pay climbed only 37%); Louis Lavelle & Frederick F. Jespersen,
Executive Pay, Bus. WK., Apr. 16, 2001, at 76-78 (stating that the average CEO earned $13.1
million in 2000, a 6.3% increase that far exceeded the 4.3% pay hike that salaried workers
received in 2000). This increase in compensation for executive officers was the continuation
of an earlier trend. From 1977 to 1989, average take-home pay increased 9% while the rich-
est 1% of the population (31% of whom were corporate executives) saw their income more
than double. See Paul G. Wilhelm, Application of Distributive Justice Theory to the CEO Pay Prob-
lem: Recommendations for Reform, 12J. Bus. ETHICS 469, 470 (1993). Between 1993 and 1997,
the hourly wage of the typical production worker fell. Kent Greenfield, There's a Forest in
Those Trees: Teaching About the Role of Corporations in Society, 34 GA. L. REv. 1011, 1014-15
(2000).
4. SeeJennifer Reingold & Fred Jespersen, Executive Pay, Bus. WK., Apr. 17, 2000, at
110 (stating that in 1999, the average CEO earned 475 times the average wage of a blue-
collar worker); AFLCIO, CEO Pay: Still Outrageous, at
http://www.aflcio.org/corporateamerica/paywatch/pay/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2002) (citing
Business Week to the effect that the average CEO made 531 times the average blue-collar's pay
in 2000, compared to a multiple of 85 in 1990). "If the pay of production workers had grown
at the same rate since 1990 as it has for CEOs, their 2000 average annual earnings would
have been $120,491 instead of $24,668." Francis, supra note 3, at 21.
5. See Lavelle &Jespersen, supra note 3, at 76 (providing examples of highly paid non-
CEO executives: Raymond Lane of Oracle ($233.9 million), Jeffrey Raikes of Microsoft
($145.5 million), and Ronald Lemay of Sprint FON Group ($128.4 million));.Reingold &
Jespersen, supra note 4, at 110 (explaining that non-CEO executives have also pocketed
huge paychecks; in 1999, executives in the number two spot received the largest raise in
recent history-up 37%-to an average of $7.6 million).
6. See IRA T. KAY, CEO PAY AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE: HELPING THE U.S. WIN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMIC WAR 17 (1998)(citing executive compensation consultant Frederic W.
Cook who suggests that the pay differential between top executives and the rank and file has
merely doubled over the past 20 years, from 30 to 1 to about 60 to 1). It has been argued
that when the value of employer payments for government-mandated benefits such as work-
[VOL. 36:1
One for A, Two for B
Widespread reporting of these vast pay differentials has not cre-
ated any sustained sense of outrage. The reason is that
shareholders have been complicit in the burgeoning gap in pay,
both by their willingness to accept exorbitant levels of executive
pay so long as a company's stock price continues to rise and by
their positive response to news of employee layoffs. 7 It is true that
particular sorts of egregious behavior, such as, for example, Enron
corporate executives selling off large number of Enron shares
while its rank and file employees were prevented from shifting
401 (k) assets out of Enron company stock and into other plan in-
vestments, have generated a sense of public outrage." Even there,
one has to wonder whether the outcry would have been as strong
had it not been the case that Enron shareholders suffered as much
ers compensation, unemployment insurance, and Social Security is taken into account, the
gap is not as large as the figures quoted in the text. See, e.g., Jack L. Lederer & Carl R.
Weinberg, Are CEOs Paid 7bo Much, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, May 1, 1996, at 30. Similarly, some
argue that the relative picture is not as bad as it would seem when one takes into account
discretionary non-wage income such as pension and health benefits. See Harry Hutchison,
Toward a Critical Race Reformist Conception of Minimum Wage Regimes: Exploding the Power of
Myth, Fantasy, and Hierarchy, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 93, 95 (1997) (citing figures indicating
that while real hourly wages have risen by only 10-15% between 1960 and 1994, real hourly
compensation has risen by almost 60% during the same period).
The merits of these positions are debatable. First, it is not clear that inclusion of discre-
tionary non-wage benefits provided by employers actually reduces the gap significantly
because many employers provide more by way of health insurance, supplemental life insur-
ance, and/or other benefits to executives than to rank and file employees. See Edward Yorio,
Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 395, 445
(1987) (explaining that corporate executives receive greater fringe benefits than other tax-
payers); Angie K. Young, Assessing the Family and Medical Leave Act in Terms of Gender Equity,
Work/Family Balance, and the Needs of Children, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 113, 156-57
(1998) (discussing the offers of more generous parental leave plans to executives than rank
and file workers). Second, even if inclusion of non-wage income has the effect of decreasing
the gap because such amounts represent a larger percentage of the income of rank and file
employees than of executives, it is not clear the lower ratio is the meaningful one. The issue
needs to be considered in relation to why we are concerned about the existence of the gap.
If the concern is motivation of rank and file employees, see infra text accompanying notes
107-138, then it is the wage gap that is meaningful, because that is the gap employees see
and are likely to react to, rather than engaging in a sophisticated analysis about the effect of
benefits. If the concern is social policy, see infra text accompanying notes 139-159, it is less
clear which ratio is more meaningful.
7. See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
8. Retirement Insecurity: 401(k) Crisis at Enron: Hearings Before S. Governmental Affairs
Comm., 107th Cong. (Feb. 5, 2002) (opening statement of Sen. Joseph Lieber-
man) (discussing the 401 (k) lockdown and noting that "the thought of employees sustaining
huge losses while executives were able to sell stocks for millions is infuriating."); Nicholas M.
Horrock, Enron: Stockholders Unprotected?, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Jan. 13, 2002, available at
http://www.upi.com/pfint.cfm?StoryID=13012002-050823-2302r (discussing anger over the
fact that top officials were able to sell 17.3 million shares of stock valued at $1.1 billion be-
fore Enron collapsed but that rank and file employees could not sell their 401(k) shares).
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as employees by the misbehavior of the Enron corporate execu-
tives.
The absence of a public outcry over the vast and increasing pay
disparity raises the question of whether we should think about the
pay of executives and rank and file employees in comparative
terms at all. Should we be concerned to learn that top American
executives are paid more than 500 times the lowest paid employ-
ees, or should we simply acknowledge that executives and rank and
file employees are two different groups that should be recognized
as discreet and independent markets? Assuming there is justifica-
tion for thinking about the compensation of the two groups in
comparative terms, how do we define a "fair" relationship between
the pay of senior executives and that of rank and file employees,
and how might we attain that "fair" relationship? This Article ad-
dresses both of those questions.9
Before turning to those two questions, however, it is necessary to
explore the reasons for the vast and increasing pay gap between
executives (particularly CEOs) and rank and file workers because
the reasons will help in discerning how to achieve a fairer pay rela-
tionship. Part I addresses the standard economic responses to the
existence of the growing gap in pay between executives and rank
and file employees, rejecting the claim that the gap is a mere func-
tion of different markets operating efficiently. It does so both by
exploring the market failure that exists in the mechanisms of set-
ting executive pay and by focusing on an alternative explanation
for rising pay inequality. Specifically, it suggests that the increasing
gap in pay between executive and rank and file workers of large
public corporations is the consequence of the move to a notion of
shareholder primacy, which has resulted in an explosion in the use
of incentive pay to compensate executives. That movement toward
incentive pay has aggravated the problem of CEO domination of
the compensation-setting process. Thus, while shareholders have
been complicit in viewing the corporation as serving a dual con-
stituency of executives and shareholders to the exclusion of other
constituencies (including workers), the incentive pay system allows
executives to benefit disproportionately.
9. The Article does not address the policy issues surrounding disparity in health care
and other employee benefits. Although many employers offer the same medical benefits to
all of their employees, many others provide greater benefits to executives and other senior
employees than they provide to lower-level employees. See, e.g., George Anders, Employee
Health Benefits May Be Fine, but Look at What Some Executives Get, WALL ST.J., Oct. 25, 1994, at
BI; Marti Benedetti, Executives Finding More Health Perks in Benefits Package, CRAIN's DETROIT
Bus., Feb. 7, 2000, at 16; Allen R. Myerson, A Double Standard in Health Coverage: Executives Are
Cradled While Medical Benefits Are Cut for the Rank and File, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1996, § 3, at 1.
That practice raises its own set of issues that are outside of the scope of my analysis.
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Part II argues that the increasing gap in pay between executives
and rank and file workers is something that should trouble us,
both because of the adverse consequences that flow from employ-
ees' perceptions of unfairness of pay and as a matter of social and
distributive justice. Part III considers the question of how we might
address the concerns raised in Part II. Pessimistic about the likeli-
hood of success of a strategy that seeks to identify and achieve a
"fair" ratio of executive pay to that of rank and file workers, it sug-
gests instead an approach that attempts to introduce more fairness
(and perception of fairness) into the compensation-setting process.
I. WHY THE ENORMOUS AND GROWING GAP
A. Standard Economic Responses
Many economists and benefits consultants assert that one should
not discuss executive compensation and the pay of rank and file
employees in comparative terms at all. This argument posits that
from an economic point of view, a comparison of the pay of the
two groups is meaningless because the market for rank and file
employees is simply different from the market for executives.' A
company will pay its rank and file employees what is required in
order to retain an adequately sized and productive work force, and
there is no economic reason why a company should consider ex-
ecutive compensation a factor in determining what that necessary
rank and file pay is, and vice versa." Is there merit to this argu-
ment?
It is certainly the case that one can identify market factors that
may be linked to a rise in CEO pay that are not operative in the
market for rank and file workers. The first is the trend toward hir-
ing of CEOs from outside an organization. Historically, CEOs were
10. JAMES K. GALBRAITH, CREATED UNEQUAL: THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN PAY 6 (1998)
(citing view of adherents of free market approach that rising income inequality is not a
problem); 1994 Corporate Law Symposium: Executive Compensation Under the New SEC Disclosure
Requirements, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 769, 813 (1995) (remarks by Prof. Kevin Murphy) ("From an
economic standpoint, the disparity itself isn't important. What's important is providing the
right incentives at the top, and that sometimes means providing much greater rewards at the
top than you tend to see at the bottom.").
11. I took this position in an essay written several years ago. Susan J. Stabile, Is There a
Role for Tax Law in Policing Executive Compensation, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 81, 100 (1998).
Several economics and benefits consultants have made this argument to me in discussions
about the pay gap.
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hired from within. There existed until the mid-1980s an "anti-
raiding norm," under which the hiring of an external CEO was a
rare occurrence that was met with surprise."
When the CEO and other top executives rise through the ranks
of a corporation, it is natural to think of pay in relative terms. An
employee starts with a certain level of pay, and as she rises in ranks,
she earns compensation increases commensurate with the rise in
rank. In that scenario, one would expect to find some reasonable
relationship between CEO and rank and file pay, especially because
"those promoted internally may accept relatively less in pay for the
status and privileges associated with the promotion."'
3
However, the historical norm has changed and boards of direc-
tors increasingly search outside of their own organizations for new
leaders. 4 According to a 1995 study of CEOs hired by 800 large
U.S. manufacturing and service companies, the number of new
CEOs who had been with their companies for less than three years
15grew from the early 1970s to the 1990s by almost 50%. The same
has been true in the years since then.
6
With the change in the historical hiring norm comes a change
in the factors underlying decisions about how much to pay CEOs.
When we shift from a world in which the norm is promotion of a
CEO from within an organization to a scenario where it is accept-
able to hire CEOs from outside of an organization, a key
determinant of compensation becomes external. The possibility of
promotion from without means companies looking for a new CEO
need to pay a premium to draw the desired CEO away from her
current position," and, perhaps more importantly, companies per-
12. ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIPJ. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 56 (1995)
(describing surprise of the business community when in 1984 Apple hired a new CEO from
the outside); see also KAY, supra note 6, at 18.
13. John R. Deckop, Determinants of Chief Executive Officer Compensation, 41 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REv. 215, 217 (1988). A proponent of the tournament theory would disagree with
this analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 30-32.
14. See KAY, supra note 6, at 18.
15. FRANK & COOK, supra note 12, at 70.
16. See Gretchen Ace, More CEOs Hired from Outside, 43 WORKSPAN 12 (2000) (citing
proxy analysis of the 800 largest corporations which found that in 1999, outside CEOs had
been hired within the past five years in 20% of the companies, compared to only 11% of the
companies in 1990);John A. Byrne et al., Wanted: A Few Good CEOs, Bus. WK., Aug. 11, 1997,
at 66 ("Back in the late 1960s, only 9% of new leaders came from outside. Now, nearly a
third of CEOs at the top 1,000 public companies are outsiders-and that number is likely to
grow."); Tom Neff& Dayton Ogden, Anatomy of a CEO, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, Feb. 1, 2001, at 32
(observing that although recruiting from the inside seems still the preferred method of
finding a CEO, among the Fortune 700 CEOs in the year 2000, 32% became CEOs within
three years of their arrival at the company).
17. One recent study has suggested that outside CEOs typically receive a large initial
grant of stock options, restricted stock, and a large cash signing bonus, the amounts of
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ceive the need to pay more to their own CEOs (and other senior
executives) to keep them from being wooed away by other organi-
zations in search of a CEO."'
Those who support this explanation for rising CEO pay believe
that the effect on compensation of the shift to outside hiring is
magnified by the fact that the pool of top CEO candidates is
small.' 9 Relative to demand, the number of people desirous of be-
coming CEOs who have the business experience, judgment, and
leadership qualities necessary to be successful in the position is not20
very large. A small pool of candidates means that once outside
competition is introduced into the compensation calculation,
prices will be inevitably driven up.
This theory for rising CEO pay (and resulting increased gap be-
tween CEO pay and pay of rank and file employees) due to a shift
to external hiring finds some support in the comparison of the dif-
ferential in pay in the U.S. and in other industrialized countries.
There is a far greater disparity in pay between U.S. executives and
rank and file employees than that between executives and rank
22and file employees in countries like Germany and Japan. The
which are correlated to the value of unvested option and stock the executive is leaving be-
hind at his prior employment. See C. Edward Fee & Charles J. Hadlock, Raids, Rewards, and
Reputations in the Market for CEO Talent 2 (SSRN Elec. Paper Coll. No. 262734, 2001), at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=262734 (copy on file with author). Because CEOs tend to
be lured from companies whose stock performance has been strong, the size of the packages
are quite large. See id. For example, in 2000, Conseco gave Gary Wendt, former CEO of GE
Capital, a cash signing bonus of $45 million to give up his GE options and become Con-
seco's CEO. Geoffrey Colvin, The Great CEO Pay Heist, FORTUNE,June 25, 2001, at 64, 70.
18. FRANK & COOK, supra note 12, at 56, 68-69.
19. See, e.g., KAY, supra note 6, at 19 (commenting on small pool of persons having at-
tributes necessary to be a successful CEO); MarkJ. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive
Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2000)(noting that the demand for higher-
skilled CEOs outstrips supply); Colvin, supra note 17, at 70 ("Demand for winners is huge,
the supply small.").
20. Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Ex-
ecutive Compensation, 69 U. CH1. L. REv. 751, 762 (2002) (noting scarcity of individuals with
necessary attributes to run large companies and intense competition among companies,
"particularly for rising stars").
21. See Kahan, supra note 3, at 1884 (noting the argument of those who claim that the
level of executive pay is explained by "companies competing for rare executive talent");
Tamar Hausman, Predicting Pay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1999, at R9 (citing view of Professor
Robert Frank that competition for top-notch decision makers will contribute to increasing
pay disparities); Tim Smart, Pay Gap Between Workers and Bosses Explodes, WASH. POST, Aug. 30,
1999, at A6 (citing position of defenders of CEO pay that the "tremendous competition for
talent" is responsible for driving executive pay upward).
22. American CEOs are paid about twice as much as CEOs of comparable companies
in Germany, Great Britain, and France. See Kahan, supra note 3, at 1884; see also DEREK BOK,
THE COST OF TALENT 70 (1993) (noting that American CEOs of the two hundred largest
companies earn significantly more than the average compensation for CEOs in large
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difference may be explained by the rise of outside CEO hirings in
the U.S. compared to those countries, where hiring is still generally
done from within an organization."
The market factors that have driven up CEO pay do not appear
to be operative for rank and file employees, notwithstanding in-
24
creasing mobility of rank and file workers. Employers have a
preference for internal hiring as a means of decreasing turnover
and training costs 2 and cite employee retention as their top bene-
fits objective.26 As a result, if the market works the way its
proponents suggest, one would expect companies desiring to keep
their increasingly mobile workers to pay a premium to retain them.
That they do not may suggest that, notwithstanding discussions of
labor shortages and increased mobility, the ability to produce
companies in France, Germany, England, other European countries, and Japan); GRAEF S.
CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS 205-08 (1991) (comparing compensation of U.S. executives
with that of executives in Japan and Germany); Martin J. Conyon & Kevin J. Murphy, The
Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and United Kingdom, 110 ECON. J., Nov.
2000, at F640, F641 (finding that U.S. CEOs earn 45% more cash compensation and 190%
higher total compensation than their UK counterparts, controlling for size, sector, and
other firm and executive characteristics); Susan J. Stabile, My Executive Makes More than Your
Executive: Rationalizing Executive Pay in a Global Economy, 14 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 63 (2001) (dis-
cussing disparity in pay between U.S. and foreign executives); Richard Morais et al., The
Global Boss'Pay: Were (and How) the Money Is, FORBES, June 7, 1993, at 90 (discounting dis-
parities between American and foreign executive pay).
23. KAY, supra note 6, at 24 (explaining that in Europe and Japan, promotions are
made largely from within). Kay points out that particularly in Japan, where lifetime em-
ployment is the norm, there is no need to pay executives a premium to get them to stay. Id.;
see also Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of "Germany Inc. " The Case of Executive Pay, 49 AM.
J. CoMP. L. 497, 510-11 (2001) (noting that globalization of market for executives may re-
sult in pressures to increase executive pay in Germany).
24. See Edwin R. Render, How Would Today's Employees Fare in a Recession?, 4 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMp. L. 37, 48 (2001) (discussing results of BNA study finding workers making more
frequentjob changes than in the past).
25. See MIRIAM DORNSTEIN, CONCEPTIONS OF FAIR PAY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 6 (1991); Giorgio Brunello, Equilibrium Unemployment with Internal
Labour Markets, 63 ECONOMICA 19, 20 (1996); Giuseppe Pisauro, Efficiency Wage, Fixed Em-
ployment Costs, and Dual Labour Markets, 14 LABOUR 213, 220 (2000).
26. See Vicki Lankarge, Keeping Workers and Cutting Costs Top Employers' Benefits Wish List,
at http://www.insure.com/health/metifestudy110 .html (last modified Nov. 20,
2001) (reporting results of MetLife study, noting that expense of attracting, hiring, training,
and developing new employees makes programs that promote employee loyalty a high prior-
ity).
27. Report Indicates US Will Soon Be Facing Critical Labor Shortage, WHITE HOUSE BULL.,
Aug. 29, 2001 (discussing report by Employment Policy Foundation indicating that, al-
though the economy is basically sound, a looming labor shortage threatens U.S. long-term
economic prosperity); see also Peronet Despeignes, Signs of US Slowdown Shown in Fed Survey:
New 'Beige Book' Figures Fuel Market Debate About Rate Cut in New Year, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2000,
at I (citing Federal Reserve survey of regional economic conditions, finding persistent labor
shortages in almost all areas); Dina Temple-Raston, Immigrants Fill Critical Gap in Wide-Open
Job Market, USA TODAY, June 23, 2000, at lB (citing Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Green-
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goods more cheaply abroad is decreasing demand for U.S. work-
ers28 at the same time that continued immigration is contributing
to an increasing supply of workers in the United States.29
Economists also offer other explanations for rising CEO pay that
are not based on the trend to external CEO hiring. The tourna-
ment theory, which attempts to justify paying high amounts to
CEOs, conceives of CEO compensation as a tournament prize for
which corporate vice-presidents compete. ° This theory suggests
that even hiring from within does not guarantee a reasonable rela-
tionship between CEO and rank and file compensation. Under this
theory, the high compensation paid to a CEO does not reflect his
current productivity, but rather induces that individual and all
other individuals to "compete" for the top spot when they are in
more junior positions. It is hypothesized that those competing in-
dividuals agree to give up some of their earnings, which are put
into the prize for which they compete. 3' There is some question
whether there is empirical verification for the theory,2 which is in-
consistent with the notion that CEOs coming from outside of an
span's reference to the nation's labor shortage as the "greatest threat" to the record-
breaking economic expansion).
28. See 147 CONG. REc. H8829 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 2001) (statement of Rep. Brown) (ar-
guing that the reason wages have not risen is that companies threaten to move production
to Mexico, Haiti, or elsewhere); KAY, supra note 6, at 21; Raj Bhala, Clarifying the Trade-Labor
Link 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 11, 17-18 (1998) (citing argument of those concerned
with trade liberalization that imports cause wage depression in the U.S.); Loewenstein, supra
note 19, at 5 (claiming that competition with lower paid foreign workers decreases bargain-
ing power of U.S. workers to demand higher wages).
In May 2001, a commentator at a Labor and Employment Law Conference observed that
the whole point of free trade (morally and economically) is to create international redistri-
bution of resources (jobs and money). It is an interesting form of income redistribution.
Instead of redistributing from the most wealthy to the least wealthy (our normal notion of
income redistribution), the effect here is to redistribute from the relatively less well off in
the U.S. to the worse off elsewhere, with no apparent redistribution from those best off in
the U.S.
29. See KAY, supra note 6, at 21; George J. Borjas & Valerie A. Ramey, Foreign Competi-
tion, Market Power and Wage Inequality, 110 QJ. ECON. 1075, 1078 (1995) (finding
immigration to have a "statistically and economically significant adverse effect on the wages
of the less educated"); GeorgeJ. Borjas et al., Searching for the Effect ofImmigration on the Labor
Market, 86 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 246, 246 (1996) (finding immigration has contributed at
least modestly to the rise in U.S. earnings inequality).
30. See generally Edward Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum
Labor Contracts, 89J. POL. ECON. 841 (1981); Brian G.M. Main et al., Top Executive Pay: Tour-
nament or Teamwork, 11 J. LAB. ECON. 606 (1993); Sherwin Rosen, Prizes and Incentives in
Elimination Tournaments, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 701 (1986).
31. Seesources cited supra note 30.
32. See BOK, supra note 22, at 100-01; CRYSTAL, supra note 22, at 278-80; Charles A.
O'Reilly III et al., CEO Compensation Tournament and Social Comparison: A Tale of Two Theories,
33 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 257, 257-58, 266 (1988).
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organization must be paid more to attract them than would need
to be paid to an internal candidate.
Economists Robert Frank and Philip Cook offer another possi-
ble market-based explanation for the growing gap in pay between
executives and rank and file employees. They claim that the growth
in earnings inequality for groups including executives is attribut-
able to the growth in "winner-take-all markets," their short-hand
for what they describe more accurately as "those-near-the-top-get-a-
disproportionate-share-markets. 33 They explain the phenomenon
as follows:
High salaries are associated with positions that entail a great
deal of leverage on the worker's efforts. In these positions
small differences in performance translate into large differ-
ences in the profitability of the venture. Corporations seek the
ablest candidates for these highly leveraged positions, and are
willing to pay a hefty price for them.... The result is that for
positions in which additional talent has great value to the em-
ployer or the marketplace [such as CEOs], there is no reason
to expect that the market will compensate individuals in pro-
portion to their human capital. For these positions-ones that
confer the greatest leverage or "amplification" of human tal-
ent-small increments of talent have great value, and may be
greatly rewarded as a result of the normal competitive market
process .... [W] hen market forces are given free play, the tal-
ented individual who has a choice of employer ... has the
chance of ending up a big winner.34
Frank and Cook are not suggesting that the increased pay is
commensurate with the increased value brought to the enterprise
by the CEO. Rather, even if the person in the number one posi-
tion-the CEO-is only marginally more talented than the person
in the number two position, the person in the top position will be
rewarded greatly (and disproportionately) for being at the top.3 5
The notion is that the determinant of pay level is the position
rather than the person. Frank and Cook do not suggest that the
33. FRANK & COOK, supra note 12, at 3.
34. Id. at 90-91. The winner-take-all theory is not limited to executives. Rather, Frank
and Cook use the theory to explain big pay differentials between those at the top and others
in a number of professions for which there is active and free competition. See id. at 3 (claim-
ing that the winner-take-all structure has been a long-time feature in areas such as
entertainment, sports, and the arts).
35. See id. at 91. Thus, while other senior executive officers are also paid quite gener-
ously in comparison with rank and file workers, there is also a vast disparity between the pay
of CEOs and the pay of those other senior executive officers.
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pay disparity exacerbated by the growth in winner-take-all markets
is a good thing. Indeed, their fundamental thesis is that the com-
petition for top positions in such markets generates waste.
36
However, they find it to be a more convincing explanation for pay
disparities than other explanations. While difficult to assess in any
empirical sense, the winner-take-all theory is consistent with expla-
nations based on external hiring of CEOs. 7
One final potential market-based explanation is that increased
CEO compensation is an exchange for reduced job security and
that at least some portion of the gap in CEO versus rank and file
compensation reflects differences in job security. Traditionally,
rank and file workers had a reasonable amount of job security.
38Notwithstanding the employment at-will doctrine, there once ex-
isted an implied understanding that workers who performed their
jobs well would be assured of keeping them (and of seeing their
pay rise), subject to the possibility of temporary layoffs.39 It even
has been suggested that "the decline in union density between
1977 and 1991 [was] due to a decline in demand for union repre-
sentation-a decline in demand related to increased levels of job
satisfaction with pay and job security.
40
In contrast, the CEOs of ten to twenty percent of major compa-
nies change every year,4' and the median tenure of a CEO is three
42years in large industrial companies. Particularly recently, CEOs
36. See id. at 101-05.
37. The theory also may be consistent with the job security explanation for CEO pay
that follows. See infra text accompanying notes 38-45. That is, one could seek to justify the
premium paid to the person in the number one position in a winner-take-all market as re-
flecting increased risk rather than increased talent. Thus, the premium paid to the CEO
reflects the fact that "[t]he CEO sits squarely where the buck stops." KAY, supra note 6, at 20.
38. Under the doctrine of employment at will, absent a contractual limitation, an em-
ployer may terminate an employee at any time and for any reason. Although there are
exceptions to the rule, it is the prevailing rule. SeeE. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.17
n.37 (2d ed. 1990).
39. See, e.g., LESTER C. THUROW, THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM 28 (1996) (describing the
post-World War II social contract); Render, supra note 24, at 45 (noting that "[w]hen man-
agers in the 1970s were forced to close a plant, they had a deep sense of regret and failure,"
whereas today, the attitude is very different).
40. Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism as a
Cause for Labor's Decline, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133, 137 (1998) (citing conclusions of
ProfessorsJarber and Kruger).
41. SeeKAY, supra note 6, at 16.
42. Id. (citing to a comment in Forbes stating that since 1993, the median number of
years a CEO remains with the same company has fallen from five to three). Moreover, CEO
turnover in large corporations is increasing. According to a study by Pearl Meyer & Partners,
the "number of open CEO positions among Fortune 200 companies in 2000 was nearly dou-
ble that of the previous three years." Catherine Friedman, Do You Need an Agent?, CEO MAG.,
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are not immune to being ousted from their positions when their
performance is not up to par.43 Within the last decade, there have
been several prominent instances of CEOs being ousted by the
boards of directors of the companies the CEOs serve44 and also of
instances in which undeserving CEOs have seen their pay re-
duced. 5 These are not isolated examples.
Despite differences in relative job security between the two
groups, the notion that lower wages for rank and file employees
compared to the rise in CEO pay somehow represents a tradeoff
for increased labor security is hard to credit. First, rank and file
workers have much less job security now than they did in the past.
There is much to suggest that the model of lifetime employment
has been eroded and that employees have greater job insecurity. 6
Nov. 2001, at 43, 44 (noting also that "impatience among corporate boards" is an increas-
ingly important factor in declining CEO tenure).
43. As one commentator noted, "The chief executive cannot have a bad season, trip or
stumble in a game without paying a heavy price. More than ever, the CEO is likely to lose his
job when he does not deliver the profits shareholders expect." KAY, supra note 6, at 16 (cit-
ing IBM, General Motors, and American Express as examples of major companies who
replaced under-performing CEOs).
44. From mid-1992 to the end of 1993, boards ousted the CEOs of poorly performing
companies in several well-publicized cases. MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL:
RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 80 (1995) (citing
as examples the ouster of Robert Stempel from General Motors in October 1992, Paul E.
Lego from Westinghouse and John F. Akers from IBM in January 1993, James Robinson
from American Express in February 1993, Kay R. Whitmore from Kodak in August 1993, and
Anthony D'Amato from Borden in December 1993); see also David J. Denis & Diane K.
Denis, Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals, 50J. FIN. 1029, 1029, 1055
(1995) (describing the fact that a number of large corporations have responded to poor
corporate performance by terminating their CEOs).
45. SeeJack L. Lederer & Carl R. Weinberg, Harnessing Corporate Horsepower: The New
Principles of CEO Compensation, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, Sept. 1, 1995, at 32, 34 (finding 30% of
CEOs in study experienced a decrease in total cash compensation in 1994, and 34% saw a
decrease in the value of their total pay package).
46. See THUROW, supra note 39, at 28 (noting that downsizing has destroyed the post-
World War II social contract of annual wage increases and essentially lifetime employment,
with temporary cyclical layoffs when economically necessary); Marleen O'Connor, Organized
Labor as Shareholder Activist: Building Coalitions to Promote Worker Capitalism, 31 U. RICH. L. REv.
1345, 1374-75 (1997) ("The old employment compact of lifetime employment has evapo-
rated. Employees have greaterjob insecurity, lower wages, and more involuntary contingent
work."); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing
Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REv. 519, 524 (2001) (noting abandon-
ment of "the implicit promises of job security that were imbedded in the internal labor
market setting"). See generally Alfred W. Blumrosen et al., Downsizing and Employee Rights, 50
RUTGERS L. REv. 943 (1998) (discussing employer freedom to downsize).
Not everyone agrees. Some argue that the decline in career-based employment reflects
worker lifestyle choices rather than any change in the lifetime employment model or ero-
sion of the internal labor market. Economists studying worker trends find that there has not
been as much of an increase in job insecurity as reported in the press. See, e.g., Francis X.
Diebold et al., Comment on Kenneth A. Swinnerton and Howard Wial, "Is Job Stability Declining in
the U.S. Economy?", 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 348 (1996) (reporting research project's
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Second, as a factor to be considered in determining whether lower
wage levels represent an implicit tradeoff for something of more
value to employees, job security appears to be less valued by em-
ployees now than it was historically. While studies performed in the
1950s suggest that job security was the most important factor ex-
plaining positive job attitudes, more recent studies suggest that
intrinsic aspects of work have become much more important to
workers than job security.48 That evidence suggests that while work-
ers might trade pay increases for other things that increase job
satisfaction and personal fulfillment, it is unlikely that workers will-
ingly accept lower wages in exchange for greaterjob security.
As the foregoing suggests, numerous market-based explanations
have been proffered to explain the widening gap in pay between
executive and rank and file workers.49 The question is whether any
finding that job stability did not decline substantially over the 1980s, contrary to other esti-
mates and media reports).
Another version of this suggestion is that higher wages that previously had to be paid to
workers as "an incentive to voluntarily cooperate [sic] with their employer, an incentive to
work hard, and an incentive not to quit" are no longer necessary without the "political
threat of socialism or the economic threat of powerful unions." THUROW, supra note 39, at
27.
47. See FREDERICK HERZBERG ET AL., JOB ATTITUDES: REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND OPIN-
ION 48 (1957); Gladys Palmer, Attitudes Toward Work in an Industrial Community, 63 AM. J. Soc.
17, 20 (1957);Joel Seidman et al., Why Workers Join Unions, in UNIONS, MANAGEMENT, AND
THE PUBLIC 41 (Edward Bakke et al. eds., 3d ed. 1967).
48. See Neal Q. Herrick & Robert P. Quinn, The Working Conditions Survey as a Source of
Social Indicators, 94 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 15, 22 (1971); SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO THE SEC'Y OF
HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, WORK IN AMERICA: REPORT OF A SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO THE
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND WELFARE (Feb. 1973) (cited in Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The
Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism as a Cause for Labor's Decline, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 133, 143 n.68 (1998)).
49. There is another possible explanation for the widening wage gap not addressed in
the foregoing discussion-the decline in unionization. See Dean Baker & Archon Fung,
Collateral Damage: Do Pension Fund Investments Hurt Workers? 3, Paper Prepared for the
Second Nat'l Heartland Labor-Capital Conf. (Apr. 29-30, 1999) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author) (discussing effect of declining unionization on wages). It is true that
there has been a very significant decline in union density. See Steven Greenhouse, Labor
Leader Sounds Do-or-Die Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2001, at AIO (citing A.EL.-C.I.O presi-
dent John J. Sweeney's warning that organized labor could drift into irrelevance if unions
did not do more to increase their ranks and noting that the percentage of American workers
belonging to unions fell from 13.9% in 2000 to 13.5% in 2001-the lowest level since the
1950s); Torri Minton, Labor; Reaching Out; Unions Widen Their World; But Organizing High-Tech
Workers Remains Elusive Despite Massive Layoffs, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 2, 2001, at W1 ("Union
membership nationwide fell from a high of 32% in the mid-1950s to just 13.5% of the work-
force in 2001, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics."). Union membership is falling
despite the creation of more than 16 million jobs since 1992. Greenhouse, supra, at AlO
(citing Bureau of Labor Statistics). This decline in union density has been accompanied by a
decrease in the political power of unions. See Render, supra note 24, at 43.
However, it is less clear the extent to which the decline in union density has contributed
to the widening gap in pay between executives and rank and file workers. Empirical
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 36:1
of them are real explanations or only attempts to justify in eco-
nomic terms a situation that exists for a very different reason.
B. Problems with Standard Economic Response:
Failure of Market in Setting Pay
If one were to take the positions advanced in Section A at face
value, one might come to share the conclusion of economists and
benefits consultants that executive pay and rank and file pay are
two completely unrelated matters. The problem is that the argu-
ments in Section A do not reflect how executive pay is actually set.
Although one can advance seemingly cogent economic explana-
tions for rising executive pay, the reality, as one academic
commentator has noted, is that executive "[o]vercompensation is
basically the fault of passive boards that a ee to salary packages on
demand, without spirited negotiations."5 Bargaining about execu-
tive pay is anything but arms-length. This is not merely an
academic viewpoint. Directors who sit on compensation commit-
tees have themselves admitted that the committees are "in the
pocket of the CEOs."
51
Professor Marcel Kahan has offered several convincing explana-
tions for the domination of boards and their compensation
evidence on the effects of unions has primarily addressed the effect of unions on members'
wages relative to other similar nonunion workers rather than on issues such as the distribu-
tion of income between labor and capital or labor and management. SeeJoanne Martin, The
Fairness of Earnings Differentials: An Experimental Study of the Perceptions of Blue-Collar Workers, 17
J. HUM. RESOURCES 110, 110-11 (1982); see also Lorraine Schmall, Introduction to Sympo-
sium: Work and Family, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 1, 7 (1998) (discussing effect of unions on wages
of women and minorities). On the other hand, the U.S. has a much smaller percentage of
unionized workers than most industrialized nations. See Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between
Collective Bargaining and Individual Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Solu-
tion, 77 B.U. L. REv. 687, 693 (1997). As already noted, the U.S. has a much wider disparity
in pay between executive and rank and file workers than in other industrialized nations. See
supra notes 22, 23 and accompanying text.
50. Adam Bryant, Some Second Thoughts on Options, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1997, § 3, at I
(quoting Professor Charles Elson); see Bebchuk et al., supra note 20, at 754 (noting that
because bargaining is not arms-length and the market forces do not correct for that, "execu-
tives can receive pay in excess of the level that would be optimal for shareholders; this excess
pay constitutes rents"); see also Colvin, supra note 17, at 64 (executive pay is "out of control"
because compensation committees do not act sufficiently independently).
51. Laura S. Unger, This Year's Proxy Season: Sunlight Shines on Auditor Independ-
ence and Executive Compensation, Address Before the Center for Professional Education
(June 25, 2001), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch502.htm (citing admission of
directors sitting on executive compensation committees); see Carol J. Loomis, This Stuff Is
Wrong, FORTUNE, June 25, 2001, at 72 (quoting compensation committee members who
suggest that they feel helpless to curb executive pay).
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committees by CEOs.52 The principal explanation is the dispersion
of shareholdings, which results in a power vacuum that creates the
potential for CEO domination. Contributing to that is the fact
that CEOs have stronger economic incentives to dominate thanS • 54
boards do to resist domination. Finally, the law contributes to the
self-perpetuating nature of corPorate boards by giving incumbents
control over the proxy process. This last point is supported by the
findings of Anil Shivdasani and David Yermack that, despite a trend
of companies removing CEOs from board nominating committees,
CEOs still have a significant impact on the nomination process.56
Several things illustrate the defectiveness of the process of set-
ting executive pay. First, as an empirical matter, there is a direct
relationship between CEO power and CEO pay. CEO pay is highest
in companies where the CEO exercises significant power in rela-
tionship to the board of directors. Thus, evidence shows CEO pay
is highest in situations where boards are very large or are com-
posed of outside directors selected by the CEO. 57 Executive
compensation is also higher in companies where the CEO sits as
chairman of the board and in companies with interlocking direc-
torates.58 It was once thought that a movement to outside directors
would make for more effective monitoring and therefore better
company performance, but the empirical evidence does not bear
52. Kahan, supra note 3, at 1891.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment
or Shareholder Expropriation , 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 135-36 (2000) (citing findings of
Shivdasani and Yermack). It is for this reason that findings that suggest that the presence of
the CEO as a member of the compensation committee does not result in greater opportun-
istic behavior than when the CEO is not a member are suspect. The significant influence the
CEO wields over the compensation committee does not depend on whether the CEO actu-
ally sits on the committee. But cf Ronald C. Anderson & John M. Bizjak, An Empirical
Examination of the Role of the CEO and the Compensation Committee in Structuring Executive Pay
(SSRN Elec. Paper Coll. No. 220851, 2000), at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=220851
(arguing that the presence of a CEO on a compensation committee does not lead to differ-
ent pay than if a CEO is not a member of a committee).
57. See John E. Core et al., Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and
Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 381-82 (1999) (finding relationship of CEO pay with
board size, outside directors selected by CEOs, age of board, and numbers of boards sat on
by outside directors); David Yermack, Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board
of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185 (1996) (noting relationship between board size and CEO
pay); see also Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Agents With and Without Principals,
90 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 203, 208 (2000) (finding where corporate governance mechanisms
are weak, corporation committees cater to the interests of the CEO).
58. See Kevin Hallock, Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive Compensa-
tion, 32J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSis 331, 332 (1997); Perry & Zenner, supra note 56, at
137.
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this out, with the result that there has been increasing skepticism
of the value of outside boards.59
Second, the absence of strong compensation committees not
under the dominance of the CEO is illustrated by an examination
of proxy statement compensation committee reports. In 1992, as
part of its amendments to Regulation S-K, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) began to require that a proxy
statement issued in connection with an annual meeting include a
report by the company's compensation committee discussing the
company's executive compensation policies and explaining the
reasoning behind the specific compensation decisions and incen-
tive awards made to the CEO and the other highly compensated
executives of the company.60 While it was clearly the hope of the
SEC that these reports would provide meaningful information to
investors, it appears that compensation committees are merely "go-
ing through the motions of complying with the SEC's disclosure
rules."6' The reports display a "lack of creativity and the tendency
of issuers to resort to markups of prior reports."62 An examination
of some of the compensation committee reports of large public
companies reveals much boilerplate language about the value of
incentive-based compensation and general compensation philoso-
phy, but the say little about the policies of the particular company
in question.
59. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAw. 921, 921-22 (1999) (finding that firms with
more inside than independent directors perform as well as companies with boards com-
posed of a majority of outside directors); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of
Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability,
89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001) (suggesting reasons why presence of insiders on boards is benefi-
cial).
60. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (1992) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249) (outlining amendments to executive compensation dis-
closure requirements); see also 17 C.F.R. § 228.402 (2002) (discussing the disclosure
requirements of executive compensation for small business issuers).
61. Scott P. Spector, The Compensation Committee Report, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SEC
PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULE § 4.2 (2d ed. Supp. 2000).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g, GEN. ELEC. CORP., PROXY STATEMENT 16-18 (Mar. 8, 2002); KIMBERLY
CLARK CORP., PROXY STATEMENT 11-15 (Mar. 12, 2002); MICROSOFr CORP., PROXY STATE-
MENT 7 (Oct. 12, 2001); TYSON FOODS, INC., PROXY STATEMENT 19-24 (Jan. 2, 2002).
Some have suggested that the relationship between the level of compensation given to a
CEO and the level of power exerted by the CEO over the pay-setting process is also sup-
ported by evidence that executive compensation significantly increases after the adoption of
anti-takeover defenses by a corporation, suggesting that the decline in market discipline
leads to opportunistic behavior by executives. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 20, at 837 (find-
ing evidence that CEO pay rises when anti-takeover provisions are adopted); see also Michael
H. Haid & Eric Nowak, Executive Compensation and the Susceptibility of Firms to Hostile Takeovers:
An Empirical Investigation of the U.S. Oil Industry (Dep't of Fin., Johann Wolfgang Goethe-
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One thing that facilitates the co-opting of the process of setting
CEO pay is the uniqueness of the CEO position. Other than the
CEO, all other positions within an organization allow the possibility
of calibrating the pay of an employee with relation to other simi-
larly situated employees. Rank and file employees generally are
paid on the basis of some combination of seniority, job rank, and
merit. Because there are others performing either the same or
similar duties as virtually all employees in an organization, it is pos-
sible to judge the compensation of one with reference to the other.
Even as one moves up into the executive ranks, it is possible, for
example, to judge one vice-president (and therefore that vice-
president's compensation) in relation to other vice-presidents
within the corporation.
For a CEO, there is no internal referent. Within any given or-
ganization, the CEO job is a unique one, meaning there is no one
else in the organization to whom the CEO can be compared. That
makes it impossible to establish, in internal relative terms, what is a
reasonable compensation for the CEO. The only benchmark is ex-
ternal-judging a CEO by reference to what other CEOs make.
This leads to competitive benchmarking, i.e., the hiring by boards
of outside compensation consultants to create compensation sur-
veys to establish CEO pay.
As I have argued elsewhere, setting a CEO's compensation by
reference to compensation surveys leads to an upward spiraling of
compensation. 6 Since few companies are prepared to say that their
executives are worth less than the average, these surveys lead to
boards ratcheting up their CEO's compensation, as boards aim to
University Frankfurt, Working Paper No. 32, 1999) (on file with author) (finding that annual
compensation levels and stock-based compensation increases after company is protected
from hostile takeovers). However, support for this argument is mixed. Some argue that any
increase in compensation reflects an increase in risk to the executive rather than opportun-
istic behavior. See Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Managerial Compensation and the
Threat of Takeover, 47J. FIN. ECON. 219 (1998) (finding net effect of increased threat of take-
over is increase in pay because of increased risk); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil
Mullainathan, Executive Compensation and Incentives: The Impact of Takeover Legislation (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6830, 1998), at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6830 (suggesting that elimination of antitakeover legislation
leads to increased pay for performance and that increased levels of pay for executives are
meant to counteract the increased risk).
64. See Susan J. Stabile, Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership
Lens: A Tool to Focus Reform, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 153, 173-74 (2000).
65. See, e.g., Adam Bryant, Executive Cash Machine: How Pliable System Inflates Pay Levels,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,1998, § 3, at 1 (citing example of Colgate-Palmolive CEO Reuben Mark,
who received 2.6 million in options in 1997 based on a consultant's report that he was being
paid below the median of companies used for comparison); The Artificial Sweetener in CEO
Pay, Bus. WK., Mar. 26, 2001, at 102 (giving example of Kodak Vice-President George Fisher
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pay their executives no less than the fiftieth to seventy-fifth percen-
tile of what comparable companies pay.6 A new study of the use of
competitive benchmarking concludes that its effect on compensa-
tion is not insignificant, finding that CEOs being paid below the
median receive larger compensation increases in both percentage
and dollar terms than CEOs paid above the median. The study
suggests that competitive benchmarking was a significant factor
contributing to the massive explosion in CEO pay in the 1990s
68
and that the ratcheting effect of the use of compensation surveys
extends beyond the CEO to other executives.69
The problem with the use of compensation consultants is aggra-
vated by the fact that CEOs are "heavily involved" in the hiring and
firing of consultants. 70 That, along with the fact that consultants
generally work for firms that have other lucrative ties with the hir-
ing company," means the pressure to keep management happy is
very strong. CEO influence on consultants is dangerous because
the structure of the assignment and the design of the compensa-
tion survey will have a great deal of impact on the survey results.7
2
The result is that pay surveys, which seem justifiable as a means to
deal with the difficulty of setting CEO pay without an internal ref-
erent, are more a tool to justify large compensation arrangements
than a means of establishing an optimal compensation level.
who, based on competitive benchmarking, received a $2.5 million bonus in 1999, 47%
higher than in 1998, despite the fact that shareholder returns fell that year).
66. See Kahan, supra note 3, at 1888 n.80 (citing labor economics handbook judgment
that a salary in the fiftieth to seventy-fifth percentile is regarded as competitive); David
Leonhardt, Executive Pay: A Special Report; For the Boss, Happy Days are Still Here, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 2001, § 3, at 1 (noting that most companies set pay scales by "researching the compe-
tition and then aiming to pay executives at the 50th or 75th percentile of what similar
companies pay"). More than one commentator has drawn the comparison between CEO pay
and Garrison Keillor's Lake Wobegon, where "all the children are above average." See Adam
Bryant, Earning It; Fying High on the Orient Express, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1998, § 3, at 1 [herein-
after Fying High] (quoting Nell Minow's suggestion that CEO land is like Lake Wobegon,
where all children are above average); Bryant, supra note 65, § 3, at 1 (suggesting that ex-
ecutive pay is set with methods imported from Lake Wobegon).
67. SeeJohn M. Bizjak et al., Has the Use of Peer Groups Contributed to Higher Levels
of Executive Compensation? 2, 30 (Nov. 15, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
68. Id. at 3, 31.
69. Id. at 3-4; see also Baker & Fung, supra note 49, at 47 (noting that increasing CEO
pay pushes up the pay scale for other executives).
70. Bebchuk et al., supra note 20, at 790; Loomis, supra note 51, at 72 (discussing the
view that consultants act on behalf of the managers who hire and rehire them).
71. Bebchuk et al., supra note 20, at 790.
72. Id. at 791 (citing Bizjack that the "vast majority" of firms that use peer groups to
determine management compensation set compensation at or above the fiftieth percentile
of the peer group).
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C. Role of Incentive Compensation: Unintended
Consequences of Shareholder Primacy
Board domination by CEOs is by no means a complete explana-
tion for the increasing gap in pay between executives and rank and
file workers. The most significant contributing factor is the exten-
sive use of incentive compensation for CEOs and other highly
• 71
compensated executives. In 1980, at a time when the ratio of CEO
74pay to rank and file pay was in the neighborhood of thirty to one,
CEOs were compensated primarily through cash bonuses and sal-
ary.7'5 However, the reality is quite different today, with stock
options being "the dominant component of an executive's com-
76pensation package," dwarfing other forms of compensation.
Although recently companies have started to give some stock to a
wider range of employees,77 the heavy use of stock forms of
73. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptions in the Vertical Dimen-
sion of Global Corporate Governance, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1133, 1174 (1999) (noting that the
effect of stock option awards has been to "substantially increase the ratio of compensation of
high-paid executives to ordinary laborers"); Loewenstein, supra note 19, at 4-5 ("Much of
the increase in CEO pay is directly attributable to the increase in stock prices over the past
two decades, as the portion of CEO pay in stock options has risen dramatically in the past
several years."); Louis Lavelle, The Gravy Train Just Got Derailed, Bus. WK., Nov. 19, 2001, at
118 (according to Business Week's year 2000 survey of approximately 365 large U.S. compa-
nies, the average CEO earned $13.1 million, four-fifths of which came from exercising stock
options).
74. See KEvIN PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR 179-80 (1991) (noting that
in 1979, CEOs made 29 times the income of the average manufacturing worker).
75. SeeJohn E. Core et a., Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, (SSRN
Elec. Paper Coll. No. 276425, 2002), at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=276425 (noting
that in 1980 CEOs were compensated primarily with cash salary and bonus and that only
30% of CEOs received new option grants).
76. Hamid Mehran & Joseph Tracy, The Effect of Employee Stock Options on the Evolution of
Compensation in the 1990s, 7 FRBNY ECON. POL'Y REv. 17, 19 (2001) (noting that new grants
of stock options average about 250% of an executive's base salary and bonus). From 1992-
1998, the salary component of CEO pay decreased from 45% to 28% of total compensation,
and the option component increased from 22% to 35%. See Perry & Zenner, supra note 56,
at 131.
77. The number of employees who have been granted stock options by their employ-
ers has grown from about one million in 1992 to about ten million today. See Nat'l Ctr. for
Employee Ownership, Employee Stock Option Fact Sheet, at http://www.nceo.org/libary/
optionfact.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2002). According to a 1999 survey by William M. Mercer,
39% of large firms granted options to at least one-half of their employees in 1999 compared
to 17% in 1993. Mercer News & Press Releases, Marsh & McLennan Companies, More Com-
panies Give Stock Options to Broad Number of Employees-Mercer Survey (June 30, 1999), at
http://www.mmc.com/news/pressReleases_71.php; see also Marcia Berss, Reviewing Your
Repricing Options, CORP. BOARD MEMBER, Winter 1998, at 47 ("[Elven the lowest level em-
ployees get 13% of compensation from long-term incentives."); Sheila Muto, Stock Options
Spur Lawsuits as Mergers Roil High Tech, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2000, 1 3 (discussing use of
stock options by Silicon Valley companies to compensate hourly workers as well as
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compensation generally has been reserved for CEOs and other
senior executives.8
The explosion in the use of incentive pay for executives is a
product of shareholder activism in the 1980s and 1990s that em-
phasized the notion that corporations should focus more on
maximizing shareholder wealth.79 Acceptance of the notion that
"the board's only job is to faithfully serve the interests of the firm's
shareholders", s° combined with widespread shareholder complaints
that top executives were being paid like bureaucrats and were not
doing enough to increase shareholder value, led to pressure to put
a portion of executive pay at risk as a means of aligning the inter-
ests of executives with those of shareholders."' Incentive pay also
began to serve as a way to address the reality that shareholders had
no meaningful way to evaluate the performance of many top ex-
ecutives other than based on firm performance.82
executives); David Tice, Employee Stock Option Costs Don't Show on Bottom Line: Lax Accounting
Standards Help Companies Hide Big Expenses, ON WALL STREET, Jan. 1, 1999, 1 2 (noting that
IBM, Intel, Microsoft, and AT&T give stock options to 100% of their employees).
78. Shannan Buggs, Stock Options Fall, but Not the Taxes, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 12,
2001, § 3, at 1; David Leonhardt, Stock Options Said Not to Be as Widespread as Backers Say, N.Y.
TIMES,July 18, 2002, at C2.
79. See, e.g., Perry & Zenner, supra note 56, at 127 (discussing role of shareholder activ-
ism in executive pay); Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions: Executive Compensation in the Era of
Pay for Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 271, 272 (1999) (noting embrace by shareholder
activists of the "new gospel of pay for performance").
80. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the
Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 405 (2001) (noting widespread acceptance in acade-
mia and in the boardroom of the notion that "shareholders alone are the raison d'etre of the
corporation"); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes,
87 MICH. L. REv. 846, 848 (1989) (discussing notion of "shareholder primacy").
81. As one commentator noted, "CEO compensation packages in all types of compa-
nies began changing markedly in the 1980s as stockholders complained that top
management wasn't doing enough to increase shareholder value. Activists pushed to have
CEO compensation tied more directly to a company's financial performance." Alicia C.
Shepard, Moguls'Millions, AM. JOURNALIsM REv.,July 2001, at 22; see also Kahan, supra note 3,
at 1888 (noting that the rise in the use of stock options to compensate executives is a re-
sponse to investors' insistence that pay be more sensitive to performance); Bryant, supra
note 50, § 3, at 1 (noting role of activist shareholders in spread of stock options); Pallavi
Gogoi, False Impressions, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1999, at R3, (noting that shareholder rights
advocates argued in favor of getting executives to act more like owners in the interest of
securing greater shareholder gains).
This notion has never really been questioned. Recent scholarship casts doubt on the ne-
cessity of paying CEOs with stock to get them to focus on shareholder returns. Research by
Professors Fee and Hadlock finds that large publicly traded firms pay particular attention to
stock price when thinking about hiring senior executives from other firms, a conclusion of
great significance given that "managers will tend to make decisions at their current em-
ployer that increase their appeal to other potential employers." Fee & Hadlock, supra note
17, at3.
82. This use of incentive pay is supported by the empirical research of Professors Ag-
garwal and Samwick, which finds greater pay for performance sensitivity for CEOs and other
executives whose performance is difficult to measure, compared to those who have explicit
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Once executives were paid in a manner that reflected share-
holder interests, shareholders became less concerned with the
amount of compensation paid to executives. Shareholders profit-
ing from the increased value of their shares were willing to accept
the notion that corporate executives should be rewarded as well. s3
As one benefits consulting firm put it, "[t]he core of the theory is
simple: as shareholders become wealthier through an increasing
share value, so do the CEOs and the executives who lead and man-
the company,',4 a formulation that leaves the rank and file
age tecmay
workers (who presumably also have something to do with the in-
creasing share value) out of the equation.
Indeed, the same concern with shareholder wealth did not
translate into a clamor for the use of stock options to compensate
rank and file employees. There are a couple of reasons why this
might be the case. First, companies may question whether stock
compensation will motivate rank and file employees because the
link between their actions and a company's stock price is less clear
than with executives.8 5 Second, heavy use of contingent forms of
divisional responsibilities. See Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, Performance Incen-
tives Within Firms: The Effect of Managerial Responsibility (SSRN Elec. Paper Coll. No. 227575,
2002), at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract-227575.
Professor Lazear suggests a different reason incentive pay is important to shareholders-
asymmetry of information. Shareholders know that executives have more information about
the company than they do. The willingness of executives to take jobs under contingent pay
arrangements increases shareholder confidence that their investment will be fruitful. See
Edward P. Lazear, Output-Based Pay; Incentives or Sorting? 16-17 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 7419, 1999) at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7419.
83. Unger, supra note 51 (noting that so long as shareholders profited from a rising
bull market, they accepted ample rewards to top executives).
84. Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Executive Pay in 2001: The Land of Opportunity (2001), at
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/us/research/resrender.asp?id=w-389&page=1 (last visited
Dec. 4, 2002).
85. 1994 Corporate Law Symposium: Executive Compensation Under the New SEC Disclosure
Requirements, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 769, 809 (1995) (statement of James H. Gross, Esq.) (ques-
tioning whether broad-based option programs are economicallyjustified as an incentive); id.
at 808 (statement of Prof. Kevin Murphy) (noting that options to lower-level employees are
more of a lottery ticket than an incentive); cf Douglas Kruse & Joseph R. Blasi, Employee
Ownership, Employee Attitudes, and Firm Performance: A Review of the Evidence, in 1 HUM. RE-
SOURCE MGMT. HANDBOOK 113-51 (David Lewin et al. eds., 1997) (suggesting that broad
based ESOPs do little to raise productivity). As one commentator recently observed, "You
have to wonder whether having a stake in the stock market will really make the receptionist
answer the phones more quickly or with a more pleasant voice or have the janitor sweep the
rooms differently." Jeffrey L. Seglin, Do Options Buy Silence?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, § 3, at
4.
It is ironic that the suggestion that stock may do less to motivate rank and file workers
does not get made in the 401 (k) plan context. The response of business interests to congres-
sional proposals to cap the percentage of employer securities that can be held in employees'
401(k) plan accounts has been that employers need to be able to encourage high concentra-
tions of stock in the hands of employees in order to motivate them. See RobertJ. Barro, The
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compensation may be viewed as undesirable for lower-paid em-
ployees, who cannot afford the risk of loss if the company does not
perform well."6
As a result, executive compensation packages favor use of stock
compensation to a far greater extent than do the pay packages of
rank and file employees. This has contributed to the increased gap
in pay between the two groups because a significant amount of the
large gains in executive pay over the last decade have been the re-
sult of the explosive stock market gains.8 7 In fact, one study has
concluded that executive stock compensation is the most signifi-
cant explanation for the increasing size of the gap between the pay
of the two groups.8s The empirical results are easy to comprehend
when one looks back at the experience of the 1990s-a period dur-
ing which executive compensation mushroomed while
compensation of rank and file employees remained stagnant or
State of the Union: Bush Mostly Got It Right, Bus. WK., Feb. 25, 2002, at 30 (suggesting that
employer stock holdings in 401(k) plans "makes sense from the standpoint of giving em-
ployees incentives to work"); Warren Vieth, 401(k) Sponsors to Fight Changes, CHI. TRIB., Feb.
26, 2002, § 3, at 4 (noting that business interests in lobbying against proposed restrictions on
how they administer 401 (k) programs argue that employee stock ownership makes "workers
more loyal, productive, and profit-conscious"); Elizabeth Wine, US Companies Review Retire-
ment Plans, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 18, 2002, at 36 (finding that employer groups say
they favor company stock in retirement plans mainly to "foster a culture of ownership
among rank-and-file workers").
86. See Stuart L. Gillan, Has Pay for Performance Gone Awry? Views from a Corporate Govern-
ance Forum, 68 TIAA-CREF INST. RES. DIALOGUE 3 (July 2001), available at http://www.tiaa-
crefinstitute.org/Publications/resdiags/68_8-2001.htm (noting argument that option com-
pensation is not appropriate for lower-paid employees because of the risk involved); Lazear,
supra note 82, at 5-6 (noting that in contrast to shareholders, workers have their "human
capital tied up in the firm," meaning that from a diversification standpoint, "transfer of
more idiosyncratic risk to labor is a step in the wrong direction.").
87. For example, John Reed of Citicorp earned a base salary of $4.3 million in 1995
and was awarded stock options amounting to $1.8 million (valued at grant). Reed's total
compensation for 1995 was $6.1 million. However, in 1996, Reed's base salary was reduced to
$3.5 million, but his total compensation totaled $10.9 million. Judith H. Dobrzynski, New
Road to Riches Is Paid with Options, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1997, § 3, at 10; see BLAIR, supra note
44, at 92 (noting that the large pay increases in the last 10 years are the result of the shift
toward the use of stock options. Stock options are the largest component of long-term com-
pensation, and in nearly every case where total compensation in 1992 exceeded $5 million, a
significant portion of the income was attributable to the exercise of stock options.); Andrew
R. Brownstein & MorrisJ. Panner, Who Should Set CEO Pay? The Press? Congress? Shareholders?,
HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1992, at 28, 31 (recognizing that if one examines some of the
most controversial pay packages, it is the stock element rather than base pay that accounts
for the largest total compensation amounts); Daniel Kadlec, How CEO Pay Got Away, TIME,
Apr. 28, 1997, at 59 (arguing that the packages that give "astronomical amounts" to CEOs
are those heavily composed of stock options); see also sources cited supra note 73.
88. Matthias Benz et al., Are Stock Options the Managers' Blessing? Stock Option Compensa-
tion and Institutional Controls (Inst. for Empirical Res., University Zurich, Working Paper No.
61, 2001) (copy on file with author).
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declined" and while many companies announced massive layoffs of
employees. 9° The same phenomenon has taken place the last sev-
eral years.91
89. See BLAIR, supra note 44, at 89 (reporting results of annual Business Week survey that
real median pay among executives of 250 large firms rose 68% from 1983 through 1993, a
period when real wages for average workers were stagnant); DAVID M. GORDON, FAT AND
MEAN 4, 34 (1996) (noting that over the past 20 years, real hourly take-home pay for pro-
duction and nonsupervisory workers-representing more than 80% of all wage and salary
employees-had declined by more than 10% and citing data of The Economist that during the
1980s, after-tax CEO annual salaries increased by two-thirds after adjusting for inflation
while production workers' real hourly take-home pay declined by 7%); PHILLIPS, supra note
74, at 18 (citing conclusion of American Enterprise Institute economists that medial real
earnings of men between the ages of 25 and 34, measured in constant 1985 dollars, were
$10.17 an hour in 1973, $9.70 an hour in 1980, and $8.85 an hour in 1987); Benz et al.,
supra note 88, at 2 (reporting that in 1998 average pay of the CEOs of the S&P 500 firms was
$7.9 million, compared to $2.5 million in 1992).
During the latter part of the 1990s, rank and file workers did achieve some modest wage
gains. See Business Bulletin, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1997, at Al (noting that pay raises for sala-
ried employees averaged 4% in 1997, a real earnings gain of 0.8%); Allen R. Myerson, In Era
of Belt-Tightening, Modest Gains for Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1997, at Al. However, those
modest gains are nothing compared to the soaring levels of executive pay.
90. The wave of downsizings that occurred in the early 1990s was enormous. "An-
nounced downsizings soared to 600,000 in 1993, set a one-month all-time record of 104,000
in January 1994 and were down only slightly to 516,000 jobs for the year as a whole."
THUROW, supra note 39, at 26. More notably, the downsizings do not appear to have been the
result of the recession in 1991-92, because they occurred after the recession among highly
profitable firms. Id. Companies like IBM, which built up a reputation over a long period as
taking care of its workers, abandoned their "no layoff' traditions in the 1990s. See Paul B.
Carroll, IBM Wants Its Managers to Encourage Certain Workers to Leave the Company, WALL ST. J.,
May 23, 1991, atA4; IBM Ending "No Layoff'Policy, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 16, 1993, at B7; Matt
Murray, Thanks, Goodbye: Amid Record Profits, Companies Continue to Lay Off Employees, WALL ST.
J., May 4, 1995, at Al; John R. Wilke, Management Firms Oust "No Layoff Tradition, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 13, 1990, at B1. These layoffs occurred at the same time that executives reaped
enormous gains. For example, in 1997, AT&T announced a layoff of 40,000 employees at
the same time it awarded its CEO $11 million of stock options on top of his $5.85 million
base salary. See Irwin M. Stelzer, Are CEOs Overpaid?, 126 PUB. INT. 26, 27 (1997). By way of
further example, W.A. Anders, chief executive officer at General Dynamics, was paid $37.5
million in salary, bonus, and long-term compensation between 1990 and 1992, during which
time General Dynamics cut almost 73,000 jobs from its corporate payrolls. See BLAIR, supra
note 44, at 9.
91. As one group of commentators has noted:
The first half of the year 2001 saw the biggest wave of job cuts of any year during the
past decade .... And yet as the U.S. economy began to slide in 2000, firms that were
sharpening their layoff axes doled out generous compensation packages to their top
executives. In fact, the top layoff leaders earned far more in 2000 on average than
other CEOs.
Sarah Anderson et al., Executive Excess 2001, INST. FOR POL'Y STUD. & UNITED FOR FAIR
EcON. 6 (Aug. 28, 2001), available at http://www.ufenet.org/press/2001/EE2001.pdf (last
visited Dec. 4, 2002). For example, Compaq announced 8,500 layoffs while increasing CEO
pay 180%; Disney announced 4000 layoffs while CEO pay increased 1541%; Hewlett-Packard
announced 9000 layoffs while increasing CEO pay 354%. Id. at 19; see also R.C. Longworth,
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Proponents of incentive-based compensation accept the result-
ing high level of CEO compensation. Sometimes the position is
phrased in terms of reward, with the claim being made that the
only factor relevant to determining the level of CEO pay is the
marginal contribution of the CEO. Under that version of the ar-
gument, the primary (or only) obligation of a CEO is to enhance
stockholder value, and so long as the CEO is contributing to en-
hanced shareholder value, she is entitled to be paid based on that
contribution.92 That version of the argument cannot be sustained
because no one has even attempted to demonstrate that CEOs are
being paid on a basis remotely commensurate with their contribu-
tion. The argument also treats corporate gain as a pie to be divided
solely between shareholders and executives, treating workers as
merely a cost of production rather than as an equal contributor to
corporate gain.
Other times, the position is phrased in terms of motivation. Un-
der this version of the argument, if one believes that stock
compensation is a good way to catalyze top executives, but that
contingent compensation is less likely to obtain the desired out-
come when applied to the rank and file workers, one may be
willing to accept large gaps in pay. 9 However, as I have explored in
more depth elsewhere, there are many problems with how con-
tingent compensation plans are designed and implemented
today-ranging from base salaries too high to ensure the effective
935
operation of any contingent compensation arrangements to in-
sufficiently high performance hurdles96  to manipulative
CEO Pay 531 Times That of Workers: Study: Gap Grows Despite Downturn, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 28,
2001, § 3, at I (citing "Executive Excess 2001" study).
92. See Linda J. Barrs, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling
Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 63 (1992) (discussing fact that corporations justify large pay
packages by claiming they are paying for performance and that executives should be "amply
rewarded" for steering company to profits); Gerald Sanders, Behavioral Responses of CEOs to
Stock Ownership and Stock Option Pay, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 477, 477 (2001) (discussing use of
incentive pay to reward executives for creating shareholder value).
93. John M. Abowd, Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Corporate Per-
formance?, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 52-S, 53-S to 55-S (1990)(discussing literature
regarding use of pay to reduce agency costs by making it advantageous for executives to
behave in a way that serves the interests of owners); Sanders, supra note 92, at 479 (discuss-
ing basis for using stock-based incentives to motivate executives).
94. See Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based Compensation Posi-
tively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227 (1999). These problems
are not inherent to the use of performance-based compensation. In the article I suggest
ways that the motivational impact of such plans can be improved.
95. Id. at 260-62.
96. Id. at 263-65.
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behavior 9 7-making it difficult to use them as ajustification for the
large pay disparities that currently exist.98 While it may be that in-
centive compensation plans benefit shareholders in the form of
enhanced company performance-and I stress "may" because the
evidence on this point is far from clear99-there is no evidence that
97. Id. at 265-70. Even in the absence of manipulation, the ability of executives to
hedge against losses from their incentive compensation defeats the motivation goal. Under-
mining Pay for Performance, Bus. WK., Jan. 15, 2001, at 70 (discussing that executives can
hedge with shares awarded as part of a performance pay plan, with the result that they actu-
ally risk very little). One academic commentator has suggested that access to financial
engineering tools such as hedging allows executives "to undo relatively cheaply the effects of
costly incentive programs." Perry & Zenner, supra note 56, at 140.
98. There are proponents of the view that high executive compensation is correlated
with performance as measured in various ways. Certainly supporters of the effectiveness of
pay for performance can be found. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Farrell et al., Executive Compensation
and Executive Contributions to Corporate PACs, 6 ADVANCES FIN. ECON. 39 (2001) (arguing that
the positive relationship between an executive's personal PAC contributions and their com-
pensation provides evidence that compensation aligns executive's personal behavior with
the interests of the firm).
99. There is some support for the proposition that the shift to heavy use of incentive
pay has achieved positive results for shareholders. See, e.g.,John Core & Wayne Guay, The Use
of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive Levels, 28J. ACCT. & ECON. 151, 151 (1999)
(finding that companies set "optimal" levels of CEO equity incentives); Brian J. Hall & Jef-
frey B. Liebman, Are CEO's Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. EcON. 653, 653 (1998)
(finding a correlation between CEO pay and firm performance); Ira T. Kay, CEOs Are a Good
Investment: Companies Employing Well-Paid Executives Show Positive Results, ROCKY MTN. NEWS,
July 14, 2001, at 2C (reporting on recent Watson Wyatt-Worldwide CEO pay study finding a
"strong positive relationship between company performance and total executive compensa-
tion").
However, there is also support for the proposition that incentive pay has not paid off. See,
e.g., Jeffrey Kerr & Richard A. Bettis, Boards of Directors, Top Management Compensation, and
Shareholder Returns, 30 ACAD. MGMT. J. 645, 658 (1987) (a company's stock price generally
does not affect changes to a CEO's compensation); Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Question-
Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 271, 299
(1999) (discussing link between increased use of incentive pay and increased use of account-
ing gimmicks to inflate corporate earnings); Jennifer Reingold, Executive Pay: Tying Pay to
Performance Is a Great Idea, but Stock Option Deals Have Compensation Out of Contro Bus. WE.,
Apr. 21, 1997, at 58 (reporting that low performance targets and huge grants create rewards
for weak as well as strong CEOs); Benz et al., supra note 88, at 4 (noting that empirical basis
for justification of stock options as incentive is weak and that it is difficult to demonstrate
that increasing incentive pay has led CEOs to work more effectively to promote the interests
of shareholders); Scott Klinger, The Bigger They Come, the Harder They Fall: High CEO Pay and
the Effect on Long-Term Stock Prices, INST. FOR POL'Y STUD. & UNITED FOR FAIR ECON. 2 (Apr. 6,
2001), at http://www.ufenet.org/press/2001/Biggeri_TheyCome.pdf (citing study findings,
based on analysis of stock performance of companies with highest paid CEOs, that large
incentive pay packages have not succeeded in aligning CEO pay and company profits).
When looking at incentive compensation, it is the degree of executive stock ownership
(and the risks associated with ownership) that contributes to performance, not the mere
granting of incentive-based compensation. SeeJohn E. Core & David F. Larcker, Performance
Consequences of Mandatory Increases in Executive Stock Ownership, 64J. FIN. ECON. 317 (2002)
(finding that increased levels of executive stock ownership results in improved company
performance). However, executives find ways to diversify their risk of company stock hold-
ings, which calls into question the efficacy of incentive compensation. See Steven A. Bank,
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the benefits are commensurate with the enormous amounts being
paid or that the same benefits could not be obtained through less
generous schemes.00 Thus, we do not have to accept the levels of
pay disparities that currently exist in order to satisfy shareholder
goals.
The concern with manipulative behavior is one that deserves
special mention given the domination of boards and their com-
pensation committees by CEOs, discussed in Section B above. As
one commentator observed, "The design of the optimal compensa-
tion scheme is difficult. Choosing appropriate benchmarks and
methods of compensation even in a world without agency costs
would be challenging. With agency costs, there are many opportu-
nities for CEOs and other executives to ensure that their
compensation is overly generous." 10 Professors Bebchuk, Fried,
and Walker have argued convincingly that a number of incentive
pay practices, including the near universal practice of at-the-money
options and the common practices of option repricing and the
granting of reload options, illustrate the power exercised by CEOs
over the design of compensation packages.0 2 They also point to
Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market and Executive Compensation, 7 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 301
(1995) (exploring use of derivatives market by executives to decrease exposure to employer
stock);J. Carr Bettis et al., Managerial Ownership, Incentive Contracting, and the Use of Zero-Cost
Collars and Equity Swaps hy Corporate Insiders, 36J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 345 (2001)
(describing various hedging strategies used by executives to reduce significantly stock own-
ership risk); Gillan, supra note 86, at 6 (citing Yermack findings that executives do not
continue to hold stock acquired upon option exercise); Eli Ofek & David Yermack, Traking
Stock: Does Equity-Based Compensation Increase Managers' Ownership?, (NYU Center for L. &
Bus., Working Paper Series CLB-98-014, 1977) (finding that executives sell stock after receiv-
ing equity-based compensation); see also David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile
Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440 (2000) (arguing that ex-
ecutives are free to hedge stock and that, although current law prevents hedging of options,
the legal barriers are unstable).
100. Indeed, that issue is rarely examined. As one commentator observed, "[t]he as-
sumption that stock option grants, regardless of size or structure, constitute compensation
that directly relates to performance goes largely unchallenged." Mark A. Clawson & Thomas
C. Klein, Indexed Stock Options: A Proposal for Compensation Commensurate with Performance, 3
STAN.J.L. Bus. & FIN. 31, 32 (1997).
In some cases, it is obvious that so-called incentive payments are not really promoting any
corporate advantage. A case in point is the 2001 option grant made to GE's CEOJack Welch.
It is difficult to justify the large grant of stock options as an incentive for future perform-
ance, especially considering that Welch was expected to retire in less than three months. See
Graef Crystal, GE CEO Welch's Pay Shows Capitalism's Ugly Side, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 16,
2001.
101. Angela G. Morgan & Annette B. Poulsen, Linking Pay to Performance-Compensation
Proposals in the S&P 500, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 489, 491-92 (2001) (citing also studies showing
that managers design compensation plans at shareholder expense). Professors Morgan and
Poulsen conclude, however, that overall, incentive plan schemes benefit shareholders. Id. at
522.
102. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 20, at 817-24, 831-34; see also Benz et al., supra note
88, at 3 (noting ability of CEOs to lobby for higher compensation with stock options).
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other research studies that suggest that the timing of option grants
is influenced to favor executives, with grants immediately preced-
ing favorable moves in the company's stock price or immediately
following a price decline occasioned by the release of negative in-
formation.o Thus, what looks to be a legitimate and acceptable
means of compensating executives is robbed of its true incentive
value and merely serves to inflate CEO and other executives' pay,
increasing the gap between executive pay and that of rank and file
workers.
II. WHY WE SHOULD CARE ABOUT THE
ENORMOUS AND GROWING GAP
Does Section I make a convincing argument that we should not
be concerned with the differential in pay between executives and
rank and file employees? I do not believe so. Even if they were
stronger than they are, the arguments based on market differences
offer possible explanations but not justifications for the gap. It is
not enough to say that market forces lead to certain results. We are
sometimes willing to interfere with the market when we do not like
its results, and the question is whether we ought to be willing to do
With the drops in stock prices that occurred over the last year, a number of boards have,
among other methods, repriced options or offered options exchanges to bail out executives.
Pallavi Gogoi, When Options Go Bad, Bus. WK., Dec. 11, 2000, at 96 (giving examples of com-
panies who have repriced existing options or granted new options because of stock price
decline). Although option repricing has the effect of weakening the link between pay and
performance, there are those who defend the practice. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., On the
Optimality of Resetting Executive Stock Options, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 65, 68 (2000) (arguing that
some resetting is value enhancing to the corporation, but acknowledging that manipulation
by management may lead to too much "resetting"). The notion that repricing is necessary to
preserve the incentive effect of options is inconsistent with the empirical findings that un-
derwater options retain their incentive value because of long maturity and high stock price
volatility. See Li Jin & Lisa Muelbrook, Do Underwater Executive Stock Options Still Align Incen-
tives? The Effect of Stock Price Movements on Managerial Incentive Alignment, (Harv. Bus. Sch.,
Working Paper 02-002, 2001) (copy on file with author); see also Mary Ellen Carter & Luann
J. Lynch, An Examination of Executive Stock Option Repricing, 61 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 209-10
(2001) (finding that despite the fact that companies reprice options in response to poor
firm-specific rather than poor industry performance, suggesting that repricing rewards poor
executive performance, there is "no evidence that executive conflicts of interest increase the
likelihood of repricing").
103. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 20, at 846 n.19 (citing Yermack and Chauvin &
Shenoy); Keith W. Chauvin & Catherine Shenoy, Stock Price Decreases Prior to Executive Stock
Grants, 7J. CORP. FIN. 53 (2001) (finding that executives benefit from temporary stock price
decreases before option grant).
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so in this situation. This section explores reasons why we should
care about the enormous and growing gap.
A. Employee Perception of Unfairness
People want and expect to be treated fairly. °4 More importantly,
how they behave towards others is affected by their perception of
whether they are being treated fairly by others.0 5 This is no less
true of employees than other persons. Employees both desire to be
treated fairly by their employers and expect to be so treated, and
part of that expectation is an expectation of a 'just or equitable• • ,,106
return for what they have contributed to the job. Because peo-
ple decide whether they are being treated fairly by comparing what
they earn with what others earn, the tremendous gap in pay be-
tween executive and rank and file workers results in a perception
of inequality on the part of workers. This perception has adverse
consequences in terms of morale, productivity, absenteeism, and
turnover.
The fact that there exists such a large disparity between the
compensation of executives and rank and file employees is well-
known to non-executive employees. The combination of improved
SEC disclosure of executive compensation matters1°7 and the level
104. Joanne Martin, When Expectations and Justice Do Not Coincide, inJUSTICE IN SOCIAL
RELATIONS 317, 317 (Hans Werner Bierhoff et al. eds, 1986) (citing "extensive and persua-
sive body of experimental research" finding that "people usually expect the world to be a
just place").
105. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Recipricity and Economics: The Economic Implications
of Homo Reciprocans, 42 EUR. ECON. REv. 845, 845 (1998) (noting that a large number of
studies have shown that people are driven by reciprocity, the impulse to be good to those
who have been good to us); Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition,
and Cooperation, 114 Q.J. ECON. 817, 817 (1999) (noting that "fairness motives affect the
behavior of many people"). In Behavioral Law and Economics terms, this is a function of
"bounded self-interest." See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Eco-
nomics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 16 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
106. Miriam Dornstein, Wage Reference Groups and Their Determinants: A Study of Blue-
Collar and White-Collar Employees in Israel, 61 J. OCCUPATIONAL PSYCHOL. 221, 221 (1988)
(citing findings of Adams, Blau, and others that employees seek equitable returns from the
employer).
107. In 1992, the Securities Exchange Commission (the "SEC") enacted major changes
to its proxy and disclosure rules, in order to give U.S. shareholders of publicly-held corpora-
tions a clearer picture of the compensation paid to "senior executives and directors" of a
corporation. Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (1992), as corrected in
Executive Compensation Disclosure Correction, 57 Fed. Reg. 53,985 (1992) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 228). This involved making changes to the executive compensation disclo-
sure requirements contained in Regulation S-K, as well as changes to Schedule 14A and
Form 10K. See 17 C.ER. §§ 229, 240.14a, 249.310 (1993). Regarding the effect of such disclo-
sure, see 1994 Corporate Law Symposium: Executive Compensation Under the New SEC Disclosure
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of public attention that has spotlighted the issue,' °s including at-
tention by labor groups,' °9 means that rank and file employees are
well aware of the size and increasing size of the gap between their
pay and the pay of the highest executives. Employees' awareness of
the tremendous disparity that exists between their pay and the pay
received by executives creates feelings of inequity.
It might be argued that workers view high executive pay as an
accepted phenomenon and are unaffected by its existence. This
notion is supported by the view of some social psychologists who
suggest that people compare themselves with those who are similar
to themselves rather than those who are divergent, " ° which would
mean that rank and file workers would develop feelings of equity
or inequity based on a comparison of their own pay with that of
similarly situated workers rather than the pay of executives. For
example, equity theorists tend to believe that the referent group
that determines an individual's feelings of equitable pay treatment
is composed of those in roughly the same job grade as the individ-
ual. " ' This is not surprising because equity theory focuses on
Requirements, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 769, 813 (1995) (comment of Prof. Kevin Murphy) ("Criti-
cism from lower level employees is a good example of the cost of disclosure. One of the
costs of disclosure is that we have to share information of 'what the boss makes' with the
entry-level rank and file.").
108. See ANDREw HACKER, MONEY: WHO HAS How MUCH AND WHY 107 (1997) (noting
that in the 1990s, CEO compensation became "a running story"); Ronald Gilson, Executive
Compensation and Corporate Governance: An Academic Perspective 647, 647-784 (PLI Corp. L &
Prac. Course, Handbook Series No. B4-7017, 1992) (indicating that the amount and manner
of executive compensation has captured public attention); Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections
on Executive Compensation and a Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REv. 201, 201
(1996) (describing topic as one of "perennial interest," such that annual "stories about ex-
ecutive compensation are as predictable as stories about spring flooding"). For a discussion
of some of the reasons the executive compensation issue has received so much public atten-
tion, see generally Stelzer, supra note 90, at 26-33.
109. For example, the AFL-CIO maintains a web site, "Executive Pay Watch," devoted to
disclosing to employees, investors, and any other interested parties the compensation pack-
ages of executives. The site is located at http://www.aflcio.org/corporateamerica/paywatch.
The home page of the site highlights the fact that CEO pay continues to skyrocket despite
investor losses.
110. See Brenda Major & Blythe Forcey, Social Comparisons and Pay Evaluations: Preferences
for Same-Sex and Same Job Wage Comparisons, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 393, 401
(1985) (finding preference for comparison with similar others); Joanne Martin & Alan
Murray, Distributive Injustice and Unfair Exchange, in EQUITY THEORY 169, 178-79, 181-82
(David M. Messick & Karen S. Cook eds., 1983) (citing findings of equity theorists that indi-
viduals compare themselves to similarly situated individuals).
111. SeeJoann Martin, The Tolerance of Injnstice, in 4 RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL
COMPARISON: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM, 217, 219 (James M. Olson et al. eds., 1986) (noting
that equity theorists find that people compare themselves to similar others).
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perceptions of pay in relation to contributions. "2 The equity theo-
rists' notion that rank and file workers view exorbitant executive
pay as an accepted phenomenon is also thought to be supported
by the view of some social psychologists that workers can become
use to any distribution of reward if it persists long enough.
113
However, although there is certainly evidence that employees
compare themselves with similarly situated workers," 4 there is sig-
nificant empirical evidence that rank and file employees also view
their pay in relation to the pay of executives." 5 Theoretical support
for these findings is found in relative deprivation theory,116 which
112. Equity theory posits that individuals determine if they are being rewarded equita-
bly by comparing their contributions and rewards with those of others and that an individual
who perceives she is being inequitably paid will aim to reduce the inequity by contributing
less. See, e.g., EDWARD E. LAWLER III, MOTIVATION IN WORK ORGANIZATIONS 18 (1973); Sta-
bile, supra note 94, at 257-59 (discussing equity theory). As applied to the workplace, equity
theory is based on Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance, i.e., the notion that individuals
strive toward consistency within themselves. Because tension is unpleasant, individuals act to
reduce tensions created by cognitive dissonance. See FRANK J. LANDY & DON A. TRUMBO,
PSYCHOLOGY OF WORK BEHAVIOR 355-56 (rev. ed. 1980); R. H. Finn & Sang M. Lee, Salary
Equity: Its Determination, Analysis, and Correlates, 56J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 283, 283 (1972) (ex-
plaining Festinger's theory).
113. See G. C. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS 263 (rev. ed. 1974)
(suggesting that any distribution of reward that persists long enough to become expected
will come to be viewed as just). But see Karen S. Cook & Karen A. Hegtvedt, Justice and Power.
An Exchange Analysis, inJUSTICE IN SOCIAL RELATIONS 19, 21 (Hans Werner Bierhoff et a].
eds., 1986) (finding support in several empirical studies for doubting the notion that less
powerful actors come to accept an unfair status quo as fair); Martin, supra note 104, at 318-
19, 330 (arguing that a finding which suggests disadvantaged employees come to expect
unfair distributions does not support the different conclusion that the employees find those
distributions to be just, finding empirical support for the notion that expectations and per-
ceptions ofjustice do not coincide).
114. Seesources cited supra note 110.
115. See Miriam Dornstein, The Fairness Judgments of Received Pay and Their Determinants,
62 J. OCCUPATIONAL PSYCHOL. 287-98 (1989) (finding that workers compare their pay to
both similar and dissimilar others); Joanne Martin, The Fairness of Earnings Differentials: An
Experimental Study of the Perceptions of Blue-Collar Workers, 17 J. HUM. RESOURCES 110, 120
(1982) (blue-collar workers compare their wages to managerial ones; such a comparison
leads to feelings of dissatisfaction and perceptions of injustice); Martin & Murray, supra note
110, at 188-89 (citing findings of relative deprivation theorists that individuals compare
themselves to upward, dissimilar referents); Martin, supra note 111, at 224-27 (reporting on
study demonstrating that blue collar workers respond negatively to significant between-
group inequality and notjust to inequalities with other rank and file workers).
116. Equity theorists and relative deprivation theorists tend to ignore each other. See
Martin & Murray, supra note 110, at 169. Martin and Murray suggest there is a political basis
for this, associating equity theory with a more conservative political agenda and deprivation
theorists with a more liberal one. Under their way of thinking, the discontent of deprivation
theorists with traditional inequalities in wealth is not appealing to the political right, who
would prefer to tinker at the edges of rank and file pay in relation to each other rather than
to change the entire system of reward distributions. That is, they imply that the research
agenda of equity theorists is the product of a conservative agenda that is not interested in
seeking to discover or justify pressure for more large-scale economic change, resulting in a
narrowing of the focus of their research. See id. at 179-87; see also Thomas D. Cook & Bar-
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posits that an individual compares the rewards received by her and
other members of her group with those received by some other
person or group and that perceptions of inequality arise from the
magnitude of the inequality between the two groups.1 7 Because the
focus is on norms of justice and equality, it is understandable that
the relevant comparison for employees here is with dissimilar
groups. Thus, relative deprivation theories support a concern with
the gap in pay between executive and rank and file workers.
For purposes of feelings of fairness regarding pay, it should not
be surprising that rank and file workers react to the staggering lev-
els of executive pay. When the issue being studied is an individual's
perception of her own self-worth, and the individual is comparing
herself to others as a means of evaluating her own opinions and
abilities, it makes sense that the reference group would be com-
posed of similarly situated individuals. However, views about the
fairness of a company's pay scheme are broader than a concern
with individual self-worth, having to do with employee perceptions
bara Pearlman, The Relationship of Economic Growth to Inequality in the Distribution of Income, in
THEJUSTICE MOTIVE IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 359, 361 (MelvinJ. Lerner & Sally C. Lerner eds.,
1981) (identifying as the cynical conclusion of those who argue that individuals compare
themselves with like others rather than with those of different social strata, "[wihy should we
care whether growth exacerbates income differentials if nothing follows from the increased
differences?").
117. See Joanne Martin, Relative Deprivation: A Theory of Distributive Justice for an Era of
Shrinking Resources, 3 REs. ORG. BEHAV. 53, 57 (1981) (describing as the basic proposition of
relative deprivation theory that "the feeling of deprivation stems from a comparison be-
tween the rewards received by one's self or one's membership group and the rewards
received by some other person or group, referred to as a comparative referent"). Thus, in
contrast to simple deprivation, which involves a feeling of dissatisfaction based on the belief
that one is receiving less than one deserves, relative deprivation involves a feeling of depriva-
tion based on a comparative referent. Id. at 56-57.
Some researchers distinguish between two forms of relative deprivation-egoistic depriva-
tion and fraternal deprivation. The focus of the former is the individual's own personal
welfare, whereas the focus in the latter is the welfare of the group of which the individual is
a part. Fraternal deprivation generally involves a comparison with dissimilar groups whereas
egoistic deprivation involves a comparison with similar individuals. See, e.g., W.G. RUNCIMAN,
RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIALJUSTICE 33-34 (1966). Under this division, a feeling of
deprivation in rank and file workers based on the pay of executives is a situation of fraternal
deprivation. However, others suggest that this model is oversimplified in the sense that all
deprivation is mixed and that multiple comparisons operate. See Martin, supra, at 62-63.
118. See Thomas F. Pettigrew, Social Evaluation Theory: Convergence and Applications in NE-
BRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 241, 244 (David Levine ed., 1967) (noting that people
compare themselves with similarly situated individuals when evaluating their own abilities
because "sharply divergent comparisons make impossible a subjectively precise evaluation").
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and notions of equity and justice."9 It thus makes sense that those
views are affected by compensation levels from top to bottom.
In addition, evidence suggests that the availability of information
influences the choice of a comparison group. 2 ° As already noted,
information about executive pay is not only readily available, but is
virtually thrust in the face of rank and file workers on a daily ba-
sis. 12' The public attention to the pay received by executives may be
a cause of the selection of executives as a comparison group.
Serious adverse consequences flow from a perception by em-
ployees that they are being compensated unfairly. Paying
executives increasingly high salaries while wages of rank and file
employees remain low, or worse, while employees are being laid122
off, has the potential to destroy employee morale. This is not dif-
ficult to understand. Particularly during economic slowdowns,
where employees suffer layoffs and stagnant salaries while execu-
123 124tive pay continues to rise, morale is likely to be decimated.
119. See Cook & Hegtvedt, supra note 113, at 19, 22 (noting that "perceptions of injus-
tice arise when the actual distribution of outcomes does not correspond to what is accepted
as the just distribution").
120. Maureen L. Ambrose & Carol Kulik, Referent Sharing: Convergence Within Workgroups
of Perceptions of Equity and Reference Choice, 41 HUM. REL. 697, 701 (1988) (citing findings of
Goodman); C. David Gartrell, On Visibility of Wage Referents, 7 CAN. J. SOC. 117, 138
(1982) (discussing the importance of awareness of others' compensation); see also Cook &
Pearlman, supra note 116, at 361 (noting that "little is known about social forces (including
the media) that highlight to individuals comparisons that they might not normally make"
and concluding from that and from other factors that the authors "would be loath to accept
the assumption that social comparisons rarely occur across social strata or the assumption
that nothing of social importance follows from any particular comparisons that occur when
income differentials are increased").
121. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text. In contrast, it may be more diffi-
cult for workers to obtain information about the pay of other nonexecutive employees. See
George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment, 105
Q.J. ECON. 256, 264 (1990) (noting that most employees do not discuss their wages with
others and that companies generally have policies of secrecy concerning compensation
levels); Gartrell, supra note 120, at 139 (discussing the fact that finding out "what others are
paid may take a good deal of time and effort").
122. See, e.g., BOK, supra note 22, at 104-05; ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW,
POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY 170 (1991); 1994 Corporate Law Symposium: Executive Compensa-
tion Under the New SEC Disclosure Requirements, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 769, 812-13 (1995)
(comments of James E. Heard, President, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc.); Sarah
A.B. Teslik, Tell Me Again Why the CEO Got a Bonus, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, July 25, 1994,
at 10.
123. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
124. SeeJames A. Cotton, 7bward Fairness in Compensation of Management and Labor: Com-
pensation Ratios, a Proposal for Disclosure, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 157, 181 (1997); Charles M.
Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867,
1877 (1992) (reviewing GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991))(noting that lavish
compensation for top executives has deleterious effect on lower paid workers "who are un-
der increasing pressure to work longer hours for less pay and whose own ability to make
ends meet is in greater and greaterjeopardy").
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Even when the economy is stable or growing, "it is devastating to
workers' morale to realize that they would have to work thousands
of years to earn what their CEOs take home every year.
''125
Adverse psychological effects on rank and file workers stemming
from vast pay disparities should be a concern for their own sake.
However, there are economic reasons to be concerned with em-
ployee morale as well. Research consistently demonstrates that
uncertainty about job position and feelings of inequitable treat-
ment reduce motivation and disrupt effective teamwork. That is,
it is not simply compensation, but also relative compensation that
affects motivation. 27Again, this is easy to understand. How can an
employee feel "part of the team" when there is such a disparity be-
tween her pay and the pay received by executives of the
-128
company? The result of lowered motivation and disruption of
teamwork is reduced productivity 9 and absenteeism. 30 In contrast,
125. AFI-CIO Unveils New Web Site to Track Executive Compensation, 70 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 79, at A2 (Apr. 11, 1997) (quoting AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Richard
Trumka).
126. See Cotton, supra note 124, at 182 (citing admission of Colgate-Palmolive Co. that
executive pay is biggest barrier to teamwork); Robert W. Keidel, Executive Rewards and Their
Impact on Teamwork, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: A STRATEGIC GUIDE FOR THE 1990's 152
(Fred K. Foulkes ed., 1991) (noting that significant gaps stratify employees into highly visi-
ble classes, harming company competitiveness, which depends on teamwork); Debate, CEO
Pay: How Much is Enough?, HARV. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1992, at 130, 136 (citing statement of
Jay W. Lorsch of Harvard Business School that large gaps in pay disrupt firm productivity);
Finn & Lee, supra note 112, at 291 (finding that employees' perceptions of pay inequity lead
to less-favorable work-related attitudes as well as to a higher propensity to terminate volun-
tarily their employment).
127. See Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Compe-
tition, 90 Am. ECON. Rrv. 166, 166 (2000) (noting relative pay motivates people).
128. SeeCotton, supra note 124, at 181.
129. See BOK, supra note 22, at 105 (citing that companies with unusually high executive
salaries produce lower quality goods than those whose executives are compensated more
modestly); FREDERICK REICHHELD, THE LOYALTY EFFECT: THE HIDDEN FORCE BEHIND
GROWTH, PROFITS, AND LASTING VALUE 95 (1996) (suggesting that research consistently
shows that uncertainty lowers morale which has significant adverse effect on corporate per-
formance); Cotton, supra note 124, at 181; Marleen O'Connor, Union Pension Power and the
Shareholder Revolution 17 (Paper Prepared for the Second Nat'l Heartland Labor-Capital
Conf. (Apr. 29-30, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (citing finding that
pay inequality leads to less cooperative work environment, high turnover, and decreased
product quality).
One reason that reduced motivation translates into lower productivity is that employees
generally have some latitude in deciding how hard to work. See DORNSTEIN, supra note 25, at
9.
130. See Ambrose & Kulik, supra note 120, at 698 (citing findings of Dittrich and Carrell
that employees are more likely to be absent and withdrawn when they perceive pay as un-
fair).
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a perception of fairness on the part of employees results in higher
levels of worker effort.
13
'
The other tangible result of reduced motivation is higher turn-
over,13 2 stemming from reduced loyalty of workers. Not surprisingly,
a worker who feels that an employer is not being loyal to him or
her feels it is acceptable to leave for another job. Thus, decreased
morale and reduced employee loyalty make it much harder to re-
tain employees, meaning increased training and other
replacement costs.
Finally, a perception of fair pay on the part of employees, be-
cause it fosters employee trust in the employer, also benefits
employers by reducing monitoring costs. a3 The need to monitor
employees to promote desired behavior is costly both in direct dol-
lar terms and in the "destructive atmosphere of mistrust" that itfo 134
fosters. Employees who perceive they are being treated fairly and
who have trust in their employers are more likely to perform well
131. SeeAkerlof &Yellen, supra note 121, at 261 (discussing findings of Mathewson that
workers who do not receive a fair wage adjust their production to the pay received); George
A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, Fairness and Unemployment, 100 AEA PAPERS AND PROC. 44, 45,
48 (1988) (finding that workers who consider themselves to be paid less than a fair wage
work less hard); Christine Jolls, Fairness, Minimum Wage Law, and Employee Benefits, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 47 (2002) (discussing empirical support for notion that employees respond to fair
wage-setting behavior by employers by working harder).
This notion is also supported by efficiency wage theory. A number of studies have found
that companies who pay higher than those demanded by the market benefit from employees
working harder. David I. Levine, Can Wage Increases Pay for Themselves? Tests with a Production
Function, 102 ECON. J. 1102, 1102 (1992); see also Carl M. Campbell III, Do Firms Pay Efficiency
Wages? Evidence with Data at the Firm Level, 11 J. LAB. ECON. 442, 442-43 (1993); Tzu-Ling
Huang et al., Empirical Tests of Efficiency Wage Models, 65 ECONOMICA 125, 137 (1998).
132. Ambrose & Kulik, supra note 120, at 698 (citing findings of Oldham, Kulik,
Ambrose, Stepina, and Brand that employees who perceive pay to be unfair express their
inequity through higher turnover); John E. Dittrich & Michael R. Carrell, Organizational
Equity Perceiptions, Employee Job Satisfaction, and Departmental Absence and Turnover Rates, 24
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PER. 29 (1979) (finding employee perceptions of equitable treatment
to be stronger predictor of absence and turnover than other variables of job satisfaction);
Daniel Farrell & Caryl E. Rusbult, Exchange Variable as Predictors ofJob Satisfaction, Job Commit-
ment, and Turnover: The Impact of Rewards, Costs, Alternatives, and Investments, 28 ORG. BEHAV.
& HUM. PER. 78 (1981) (finding job satisfaction and commitment to be related to turn-
over); Charles S. Telly et al., The Relationship of Inequity to Turnover Among Hourly Workers, 16
ADMIN. Sci. Q. 164 (1971) (finding that perceptions of inequity are associated with turn-
over).
133. SeeJolls, supra note 131, at 49-50 (discussing relationship between wages and need
to monitor); Jonathan S. Leonard, Carrots and Sticks: Pay, Supervision, and Turnover, 5J. LAB.
ECON. S136 (1987) (finding that payment of wage premiums reduces need for monitoring
and results in decreased turnovers); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-
Capitalist Society, 24J. CoRP. L. 869 (1999) (discussing role of trust in team production).
134. Mitchell, supra note 133, at 884.
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even when no one is watching them. Trust is both a less expensive
and a more effective way of reducing agency cost problems.135
The market does not act in a way to avoid these adverse conse-
quences. While there is evidence that some firms pay above-marketS • • 136
wages in order to increase productivity, and that a major reason
firms do not cut wages in a recession is fear of worker perception
of unfairness,"' companies continue to allow vast disparities in pay
between executives and rank and file workers. That companies act
in what empirically has been shown to have tangible negative con-
sequences provides further proof of the problems with the means
by which executive compensation is determined.
At a minimum, this suggests that if such large disparities in pay
between senior executives, such as CEOs, and rank and file em-
ployees are to exist, the disparity needs to be justified to
employees. There must be some persuasive explanation of the
compensation structure-an explanation that will convince em-
ployees that pay differentials are just or fair-in order to avoid the
adverse effects of its existence. 3 This is perhaps plausible in the-
ory, but it is difficult to imagine an explanation that would
convince a worker that a pay ratio of 500:1 is reasonable.
B. Social Justice Concerns
Regardless of concerns about employee morale and its effect on
corporate performance, we could simply decide that "[p] ublic pol-
icy does not support extreme distortions in income distribution,
and taxpayers should not have to subsidize high-level executives
through business tax deductions.' ' 3 9 Clearly, we have not adopted
135. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law 5, 21-22 (UCLA L. Res. Paper Series, Research Paper No. 01-15,
2001), at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=241403 (noting that trust works in situations
where market incentives and legal sanctions do not, with the result that firms that cultivate
trust may enjoy competitive advantages over those that do not).
136. See sources cited supra note 131 (regarding studies of efficiency wage theory).
137. See Truman F. Bewley, A Depressed Labor Market as Explained by Participants, 85 Am.
ECON. REv. 250, 252-53 (1995); Fehr & Gachter, supra note 105, at 817 (citing findings of
Bewley, Campbell, Kamlani, and others).
138. As one commentator has noted, "Maintaining a policy of fair or just pay has come to
be perceived as an important means of achieving employee motivation." DORNSTEIN, supra
note 25, at 9. Professor Dornstein cites several studies discussing the relationship between
concepts of fair pay and employee willingness to contribute to the enterprise. Id.
139. Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Ex-
ecutive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 79 (1992) (citing statement of Rep. Sabo).
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this notion as of yet. Despite legal limits on the ability to deduct
compensations at the upper end 40 and of a legally-imposed floor
below which income of the lowest-paid workers cannot fall,' 4' salary
decisions have traditionally been viewed as private matters-
matters to be left to the market and to the business judgment ofS 142
directors. We have been reluctant to interfere in what are viewed
as private business decisions in the name of producing a desired
social outcome. 14 This begs the question, has the gap in pay be-
tween CEOs and rank and file employees grown so large that we
should adopt a different view about compensation decisions?
44
If there is a time for making such a judgment, that time is now.
The United States is experiencing a large and growing inequality
in the distribution of wealth and income. From 1983 to 1997, the
net worth of the top 5% of U.S. households increased, while the
remaining 95% of households saw their net worth decrease. 14 In
fact, income disparity has increased faster in the United States than
in other industrialized countries, 146 perhaps reflecting that other
140. See infra text accompanying notes 180-181.
141. Minimum wage statutes generally create the threshold below which no worker can
be paid. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994); N.Y. LAB. L. §§ 650, 652 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1999).
In addition, federal and state law require that certain employees be paid a prevailing wage,
that is, the average pay rate for an occupation in a locality. See 40 U.S.C. § 3141 (2002) (ex-
plaining that "prevailing wage" includes "basic hourly rate of pay" and pension, medical, and
other ancillary benefits); N.Y. LAB. L. § 230(1) (McKinney 1986) (defining "prevailing wage"
in the context of building service employees). Lamentably, the minimum wage has been set
at "a level well below the poverty line." ROBERT POLLIN & STEPHANIE LUCE, THE LIVING
WAGE 3 (1998).
142. See, e.g., Int'l Ins. Co. v.Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458 (11th Cir. 1989). In the words of
one commentator, "the courts do not want to get involved" in board compensation deci-
sions. Barris, supra note 139, at 81.
Even more broadly, many are unconcerned with increasingly inequality of condition. In-
stead, they adhere to a goal of broad economic growth, accepting the mantra that a rising
tide raises all ships, unconcerned that the ships of some (generally those that have more in
the first place) will rise far more than those of others. See Cook & Pearlman, supra note 116,
at 360.
143. See Vincent M. DeLorenzo, Equal Economic Opportunity: Corporate Social Responsibility
in the New Millennium, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 51, 57-58 (2000) (discussing reluctance to em-
brace concept of regulating private decisions to achieve a desired social outcome and
arguing for imposing social obligations on private actors).
144. See GALBRAITH, supra note 10, at 19, 266 (suggesting that the rise in wage and sal-
ary inequalities raises questions about the legitimacy of the market system and that we need
a rebellion "as against the analytical tyranny of the idea of the market, as it applies to pay").
145. Jeff Gates, Labor Must Reckon with Ownership, 5 PERSP. ON WORK 10 (2001) (noting
also that an amount equivalent to 1/7 of GDP is in the hands of the 400 most wealthy
Americans); Greenfield, supra note 3, at 1016 (noting that income inequality in the U.S. "is
worsening and stands at historically high levels").
146. See, e.g., THUROW, supra note 39, at 21 (citing increase in the earnings disparity in
the 1980s); Greenfield, supra note 3, at 1019 (citing recent study findings that U.S. "has
highest overall poverty rate among the sixteen advanced economies"); O'Connor, supra note
46, at 1376.
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countries have a much "deeper commitment to worker protection,
evidenced by their wage-setting policies." 147 No other industrialized
country has a child poverty rate equal to that of the United States,
148
where twenty percent of children grow up poor.
Before deciding that we should take action on this policy, one
.... 141
needs to decide if the real concern should be wealth disparity or
disparity in compensation (earned) income. If the real social pol-
icy concern is wealth disparity, we should find more direct means
of addressing that issue. Large wage income disparities contrib-
ute to large wealth disparities because earnings account for the vast
bulk of income for average wage earners. 151 However, because non-
wage income constitutes the bulk of income for the wealthiest,'
52
wealth disparities cannot be addressed merely by minimizing the
large disparities that exist in wage income. For example, capital
gains flow disproportionately, and partnership net profits flow al-
most exclusively, to the wealthiest percentile of Americans.1
53
147. See Cunningham, supra note 73, at 1140 (suggesting that the difference in the level
of commitment to workers between European countries and the United States may explain
the fact that those countries have a much smaller disparity in the pay of executive vs. rank
and file workers); Conyon & Murphy, supra note 22, at F667 (noting that the U.S. as a society
is more tolerant of income inequality than the U.K and noting that while U.S. reaction to
excessive CEO pay is to increase pay for performance, thus exacerbating the inequality, the
U.K. reaction is wage compression and reducing the pay-for-performance link). But see Chef-
fins, supra note 23, at 497 (observing trend in German companies toward less employee
protection).
148. See Wilhelm, supra note 3, at 470.
149. See PHILIPS, supra note 74, at ix (the combined net worth of the 400 richest Ameri-
cans trebled from $92 billion in 1982 to $270 billion in 1989, during the same time that U.S.
median family income barely stayed ahead of inflation); EDWARD N. WOLFF, Top HEAVY: A
STUDY IN THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF WEALTH IN AMERICA 5 (1995) (A Twentieth Cen-
tury Fund Report) (reporting increasing inequality in both income and wealth).
150. If Congress' concern is income disparity, it could consider a suggestion made by
Derek Bok that would not affect business decisions. He suggests that "the ideal way to re-
move excessive earnings in a highly imperfect market" is a more steeply progressive income
tax, arguing that such a proposal will require little or no administrative burden and that it
will not risk driving talented people arbitrarily from one occupation to another. BOR, supra
note 22, at 275-80. Such a notion is not new. In 1963, an executive who earned taxable in-
come of over $400,000 had a marginal tax rate of 91%. See CRYSTAL, Supra note 22, at 25.
Individual income was taxed at a high marginal rate of 50% until 1987, and as recently as
1968, the rate was 70%. Id. at 150.
151. See GALBRAITH, supra note 10, at 11 ("[W]ages and salaries account for over half of
all income flows and for most of the incomes of the 135 million Americans in the labor
force, plus their dependants."); THUROW, supra note 39, at 20 (noting that earnings repre-
sent 93% of income for males between the ages of 24 and 44).
152. See GALBRAITH, supra note 10, at 12, 13 (nonwage income is major source of ine-
quality because of uneven distribution of capital ownership; wealthiest Americans rely on
wages and salaries for less than one-half of their income).
153. See id. at 14.
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Interest income is slightly less concentrated, but still flows dispro-
portionately to the wealthiest.
154
Notwithstanding the foregoing, I would argue that the extent of
income disparity itself, apart from its effect on wealth disparity, is• 151
inconsistent with any acceptable theory of distributive justice.
This is not a suggestion that we insist on equality of income. We
live in a society that accepts economic inequality in principle as
just, meaning that the problem is not inequality of income per156
se. Few in American society would dispute that executives should
be paid more than rank and file workers. Indeed, many would say
executives should be paid much more.
What I do suggest is that to satisfy our notions of distributive jus-
tice, unequal distributions of income must satisfy notions of equity,
meaning at a minimum that rewards should be allocated in pro-
• • 157
portion to contributions. The assumption that a just distribution
is one which allocates rewards in proportion to contribution has
been described as underlying "the meritocratic ideology, derived
from the Protestant ethic, which provides the value framework of
Western capitalism.
''l5s
In order to be satisfied with the justice of our system of allocat-
ing income, we should be convinced that the disparity in CEO and
rank and file compensation reflects correspondingly vast disparities
154. Id.
155. A focus on distributive justice supports focusing on distributions of income from
labor rather than on wealth distributions because "[d]istributive justice is primarily a prob-
lem of incomes rather than of possessions." John A. Ryan, Distributive Justice: The Right and
Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth, in ECONOMIC JUSTICE SELECTIONS FROM DISTRIBU-
TIVEJUSTICE AND A LIVING WAGE 5 (Harlan R. Beckley ed., 1996).
. 156. SeeJAMES R. KLUEGEL & ELIOT R. SMITH, BELIEFS ABOUT INEQUALITY: AMERICA'S
VIEW OF WHAT IS AND WHAT OUGHT TO BE 5 (1986) (discussing "logic of opportunity syllo-
gism," which justifies economic inequality based on opportunity for advancement and that
individual outcomes are proportional to individual inputs). Kluegel and Smith refer to the
"dominant ideology" of Americans that includes a "widely held set of beliefs involving the
availability of opportunity, individual explanations for achievement and acceptance of un-
equal distributions of rewards." Id at 11. This notion is supported by the findings of a
national survey they conducted, which finds strong disagreement with the notion of equal
pay and acceptance of inequality in pay. See id. at 141.
157. See, e.g., HOMANS, supra note 113 (describing theory of distributive justice based on
contributions). The three basic rules of distributive justice are that rewards should be allo-
cated in accordance to contribution (contribution principle), rewards should be allocated
equally (equality principle), or that rewards should be allocated according to need (need
principle). See DORNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 38. Some would argue that a distribution rule
based on reward makes most sense where the goal is enhancing efficiency and maximizing
economic productivity. See id. at 38-39. I have already suggested that the equality principle is
inappropriate here. There are those who would suggest that all principles of distribution are
merely variations on the principle of contribution. See id. at 40 (citing equity theorists such
as Walster).
158. MORTON DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
9 (1985).
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in their levels of contributions. 59 If, instead, there is a fundamental
flaw in the process that results in executives receiving exceedingly
large rewards but rank and file employees being "required by cir-
cumstances to be satisfied with having less than their fair share of
the revenues they produce,' 6 ° we have a system in need of change.
I have already suggested that the case is the latter and not the for-
mer in Part I.B. Far from reflecting a fair allocation in accordance
with contributions, pay trends in the United States reflect a social
injustice that is inconsistent with democratic theory and practice.
Notions of equity may even take us beyond a simple requirement
that rewards be in proportion to contributions. Acceptance of the
principle of unequal incomes does not necessarily require accep-
tance of any level of inequality. We may decide that some levels of
inequality are simply unacceptable because they create a "threat to
fairness, community, and decency. 1 61 In fact, many people believe
"that there is a maximum level of income that any person, regard-
less of the importance of his or her contribution, is worth,1 62 a
view confirmed by research finding that many Americans favor a
system that has a more restricted range of income than exists to-
day.
163
It is also possible that our social policy concerns are broader
than the notion of distributive justice (and its emphasis on the re-
lationship between reward and contribution) expressed above. We
could also be concerned that vast and rising income inequalities
are a threat to social stability. James K. Galbraith has expressed a
159. Clearly there are compensation disparities that do not reflect the levels of contri-
bution. See, e.g., Cotton, supra note 124, at 159 (arguing that CEOs are becoming wealthy
based on the position they hold rather than on what they contribute). Cotton argues that, in
contrast to CEOs of yesteryear who were entrepreneurs, CEOs today are merely maiiagers
whose skill lies in organization rather than in invention or creation. Id.
There is another possibility. One could argue that higher wages for certain positions are
recompense for greater education costs. Higher education costs may be an argument justify-
ing higher wages, but it is hard to justify the enormous wage differentials that exist on that
ground. See BOK, supra note 22, at 13 (suggesting that although it is plausible to say that
certain professions should get paid more because of educational expense, education costs
do not explain the premiums paid for those positions); FRANK & COOK, supra note 12, at 90
(arguing that even though people who invest in schooling should make more, educational
costs do not explain increased inequality).
160. Cotton, supra note 124, at 157. A vast majority of people believe that the system
produces too high a level of income for executives and too little a level of income for rank
and file workers. See KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra note 156, at 120 (reporting survey results find-
ing that 71% believe that owners and executives of large corporations get paid too much
and that 60% believe that non-unionized factory workers receive too little).
161. Yablon, supra note 99, at 301.
162. Id. at 121 (describing this as a prevailing belief).
163. Id. at 121-22.
FALL 2002]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
concern that pay gaps have gotten so wide as to threaten "the social
solidarity and stability of the country. 1 64 He warns:
A high degree of inequality causes the comfortable to disavow
the needy. It increases the social and the psychological dis-
tance separating the haves from the have-nots, making it
easier to imagine that defects of character or differences of
culture, rather than an unpleasant turn in the larger scheme
of economic history are at the root of the separation. It is
leading toward the transformation of the United States from a
middle-class democracy into something that more closely re-
sembles an authoritarian quasi-democracy with an overclass,
an underclass, and a hidden politics driven by money.165
While the focus of Galbraith's concern is broader than the gap
in pay between executives and rank and file employees, this gap is
obviously a large contributor to the problems he identifies. The
gap in pay between CEOs and others is problematic in and of itself,
and CEO pay contributes to increasing wage inequality generally
by shifting income upwards at the top end of the income scale. As
one commentator noted, "If the CEO can make $20 million a year
then it is reasonable for their assistants to believe that they should
earn over $1 million a year, and maybe for the people just below
them to earn $600,000 a year."166
As to the gap between CEOs and the lowest paid employees,
reading Galbraith's words brought to mind an incident from my
own experience as a lawyer. Some years ago, I worked on an initial
public offering (IPO) for a company that had executive officers
who were very good at what they did, but were not extraordinary. I
drafted the various stock plans under which they became quite
wealthy. I recall conversations immediately prior to the IPO with
the CEO, who, at that time, was still a somewhat humble man. His
reaction to the notion that he would receive generous grants of
options and bonus stock in the initial public offering was a kind of
wonder that he would be receiving so much, amounts he described
as more money than he could possibly ever need and more than he
deserved. That reaction did not last long. Before the company had
164. GALBRAITH, supra note 10, at 3.
165. Id. at 3-4; see also Yablon, supra note 99, at 301 (noting that vast disparities in
wealth are a "threat to fairness, community and decency"). As Professor Yablon observes,
"Almost nobody, rich or poor, wants to live in a society dominated by a small group of ex-
tremely wealthy people, a somewhat larger group of the fairly well off, and a large majority
of individuals who are barely making ends meet." Id. at 301-02.
166. Baker & Fung, supra note 49, at 37.
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been public five years, it was clear that he believed that all he had
received was somehow his due and that he had an entitlement to get
more and more.' 7 As this story illustrates, we have allowed the
creation of an overclass of people at the top who believe it is their
due to receive amounts of money that a decade ago we would have
thought unbelievable. It is hard not to conclude, as does Galbraith,
that we ought to be concerned.
In addition to the threat to social stability, rising wage disparities
also create a threat to the American image. Consider whether a
country that holds itself out as a moral leader of the developed
world should be happy with a compensation system that distributes
so little to so many while others reap disproportionately large
benefits. We need to decide how much inequality we are willing to
accept, which requires a hard consideration of our moral and so-
cial values.
If one accepts this broader view of social policy concerns, then
the social policy argument is not dependent on market failure.
Even if one is not convinced by my claims about the defective na-
ture of the executive pay-setting process, aggravated by the shift to
incentive compensation, the concerns raised in this section argue
in favor of some kind of intervention to narrow the pay ratios that
currently exist between executives and rank and file employees.
Even if market explanations were to give a satisfactory reason for
the gap, there are reasons to be concerned and to intervene y and
we should not be apologetic about regulating private action in or-
der to achieve a desired social outcome.1
69
167. I emphasize believe because I think the point here is not the reality of his pay in re-
lationship to his contribution to the corporation's success, but rather the psychological
impact of his pay on him and how that affects his dealings with others.
168. There is no lack of precedent for laws designed to address social concerns. Mini-
mum wage legislation is a good example. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1993). The federal
government has also not been shy about using its taxing power to achieve social aims, for
example, highly taxing cigarettes and luxury automobiles. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 5701, 4001
(1995).
169. See DiLorenzo, supra note 143, at 53-58 (discussing justifications for imposition of
social obligations on corporations); Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial Discre-
tion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REv. 579, 629 (1997) (discussing
obligation of corporations "to contribute to the betterment of society in a manner distinct
from the maximization of corporate profit"); Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely:
Congress' Misguided Decision to Leave 401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'y 361 (2002) (justifying government regulation of 401(k) plans based on
notion that corporations are creations of society possessing only the rights given to them by
law).
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III. How TO ADDRESS THE CONCERNS RAISED BY
THE ENORMOUS AND GROWING GAP
Once we decide we care about the disparity in pay between
CEOs and rank and file employees, we need to decide what, if any-
thing, to do about it. This section discusses two different
approaches for addressing the concerns raised in the previous sec-
tion. The first approach is to attempt to determine an appropriate
relation in pay between executive and rank and file workers and
then to seek a means of obtaining the'desired ratio. The second
approach is to attempt to secure greater fairness procedurally,
which involves structuring the pay of rank and file workers more
like that of executives (i.e., more incentive-based), while at the
same time attempting to find means to minimize the manipulative
use of incentive pay.
A. Identifying and Achieving a Fair Pay Relationship
1. What it Means to Have Fair Pay Relationship-A significant dif-
ficulty with attempting to evaluate executive compensation in
relation to rank and file compensation is the virtual impossibility of
deciding what is an appropriate relation between the two. That ex-
ecutives once averaged 40 times the pay of rank and file employees
and now they average 500 times that pay says little about what is an
appropriate relation. Apart from the difficulty in comparing the
two numbers because of changes in the tax laws and changes in
non-wage compensation, what does the increase mean? Was 40 the
correct multiple, or were executives not making a large enough
multiple of rank and file compensation in the past? If 500 is too
much, why is it too much and what is the correct multiple? There is
no logical or intuitive reference point by which to answer.
Therefore, we need to consider whether it is possible to deter-
mine what the appropriate relationship should be. This question
has not received much attention. When Representative Sabo first
proposed in 1991 to limit the tax deductibility of executive com-
pensation to 25 times the compensation of the lowest-paid full-time
worker in the organization in question, he picked the 25 times ra-
tio because, at the time, it would have resulted in CEO's being paid
approximately $200,000, which is "what the President of the
United States gets. Why should some corporate executives get
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more?'"'7 That is hardly sufficient to establish the appropriate rela-
tionship.
To attempt to establish an acceptable pay ratio, we need to iden-
tify what is a reasonable compensation ratio in terms of the goals
we are seeking to attain, i.e., addressing employees' perception of
fairness and achieving a relationship in pay that we believe is so-
cially just. That requires two things. First, we need a ratio that is
perceived as fair because it is the perception of fairness that will
address the concerns with the adverse impact of the large disparity
on the motivation and productivity of rank and file employees ar-
ticulated in section II.A. Second, we need a ratio that is, in fact,
fair, because it is the actual fairness that addresses the concerns for
social justice articulated in section II.B.
Regarding the first of those necessities, achieving a perception
of fairness is no small matter. Attempting to fashion a numerical
ratio that seems fair to the rank and file is difficult. Most people
think they are more intelligent and more productive and have bet-
ter leadership qualities than their peers."' On what basis will
workers believe that whatever ratio is chosen will be fair?
Regarding the second need, that of creating a ratio that is fair in
actuality, our view of the social policy at stake is relevant. If the mo-
tivation is a social policy against extreme income distortions based
on a theory of distributive justice, we need a compensation ratio
that more fairly rewards employees for their contributions. If, how-
ever, the social policy at stake is a broader concern with the impact
of rising income inequalities on social stability, attempting to find
the proper ratio becomes much more complicated.
2. How to Attain Fairness/Equity--Assuming we could determine
the appropriate relationship, or at least an acceptable general
range, a no less difficult question is how to attain it. Since relying
on companies to adopt voluntarily a reasonable compensation ra-
tio is not likely to be successful, lv1 and because the market will not
170. Thomas McCarroll, The Shareholders Strike Back: Executive Pay, TIME, May 4, 1992, at
46; see infra note 174.
171. E.g., FRANK & COOK, supra note 12, at 104-05 (noting that most people think they
are more intelligent, more productive, and have better leadership qualities than their peers
and citing study that more than 90% of workers believe they are more productive than the
median worker); see also DORNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 14 (citing researchers who suggest
that "any attempt to achieve a 'just' distribution is doomed to failure since no party will be
satisfied with its share and will always contest the shares of its neighbors").
172. Some companies may do so on their own, but it is not likely that many will. An ex-
ample of one that did for a number of years is Ben and Jerry's Homemade, Inc., in which
the highest paid executives for years received no more than five times the pay of the lowest-
paid full-time employee. See BEN COHEN & JERRY GREENFIELD, BEN & JERRY'S DOUBLE Dip
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force them to do so, how should we try to force or provide incen-
tives to encourage companies to comply with that relationship?
This section explores two possible means of achieving a more ac-
ceptable pay ratio: implementing a legally-imposed pay cap or
ration and requiring disclosure of pay ratios to encourage estab-
lishment of a more fair ratio. The section ultimately concludes that
neither is likely to be successful.
a. Legally-Imposed Cap/Ratio-One approach to consider is cap-
ping the pay of a company's CEO (and other senior executives)
either at an absolute level or at a fixed multiple of a company's
lowest paid employee. This could be accomplished either by the
use of the Internal Revenue Code, such as denying a tax deduction
for any compensation in excess of a certain multiple,1 3 something
that has been proposed in the past,1 74 or by an outright cap im-
posed by state corporate law. Either version of this approach
directly interferes with the market by imposing a pre-determined
wage relationship on corporate actors. Although such a suggestion
may seem heretical to free market proponents, it is useful to re-
mind ourselves that this heresy is not novel. In the period before
Adam Smith, the discussion of wages was largely a discussion of "at
what level wages ought to be, given their presumed effects on
184 (1997); Cotton, supra note 124, at 183. However, when searching for a new external
CEO in 1995, the company had to do away with the salary ratio because of difficulty recruit-
ing. See COHEN & GREENFIELD, supra, at 184; Miles Weiss, Ben & Jerry s Executive Pay Scales
Likely to Take an Upward Turn, TIMES UNION, Apr. 22, 1995, at CIO. Thus, competitive con-
cerns, real or imagined, will prevent companies from adopting a limit on their own.
173. A deductibility limit would be an administratively easy solution. Section 162(a) (1)
of the Internal Revenue Code permits a taxpayer to take a deduction for ordinary and nec-
essary business expenses, including "a reasonable allowance for salaries or other
compensation for personal services actually rendered." 26 U.S.C. § 162(a)(1) (1994). Con-
gress could simply amend section 162 to provide that annual compensation paid to CEOs
and other executive officers that exceeds a specified multiple of rank and file pay (either
average or lowest paid employee) may not be deducted as an ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expense.
174. In 1991, Congress considered a proposal to limit the tax deductibility of executive
compensation to 25 times the compensation of the lowest-paid full-time worker in the same
organization. See The Income Disparities Act of 1991, H.R. 3056, 102nd Cong. (1991) (disal-
lowing a tax deduction for "excessive compensation," defined as compensation in excess of
the 25 times ratio). Similar legislation was introduced in July 1999. See The Income Equity
Act of 1999, H.R. 740, 106th Cong. (1999) (disallowing a deduction for CEO compensation
in excess of 25 times the salary of the lowest-paid full-time employee). Rep. Sabo, who spon-
sored both bills, continues to push for legislation of this type. See Frederic J. Fromer,
Minnesota Congressman Works to Narrow Gap Between CEO and Employee Pay, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Apr. 7, 2000, available at http://www.house.gov/sabo/ap-ie.htm (last modified Nov. 1, 2002).
On July 31, 2001, Rep. Sabo reintroduced the Income Equity Act, which still used the same
25 times multiple, capping the tax deductibility of executive compensation at 25 times the
salary of the lowest-paid full-time employee. The Act was referred to the House Committee
on Ways and Means on July 31, 2001. There has been no action since.
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prices, exports, productivity, and so on.'' The prevailing view was
that it was acceptable for the government to establish policies de-
signed to ensure a desired level of wages. As recently as thirty
years ago, during the Nixon administration, mandatory wage-price
controls existed.
1 77
Nonetheless, there are problems with a legally imposed cap or
ratio, even assuming it were politically viable to enact one. 78 Be-
cause fifty states can hardly be counted on each to enact changes
to their corporate codes, 79 the most viable means of accomplishing
a legal limit is the sort of ratio limit to deductibility that has been
proposed in the past. As the following discussion explores, there
are at least two problems with that approach. First, the ratio would
be ineffective in actually affecting the level of executive pay in rela-
tion to that of rank and file workers. Second, it would not address
sufficiently the problem of perception of fairness.
The first problem is that even if Congress were to adopt such a
provision, it would be unlikely to have a significant effect. The ex-
perience with both Code section 162(m), which provides that
(subject to certain exceptions) annual compensation paid to the
CEO and the four other highest paid officers of public companies
which exceeds $1 million may not be deducted as an ordinary and
necessary business expense, and Code section 280(G), which
175. KENNETH LAPIDES, MARX'S WAGE THEORY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: ITS ORI-
GINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND INTERPRETATION 13 (1998).
176. Id. For example, in the late Middle Ages, workers were subject to "a comprehensive
schedule of wages, hours and other regulations promulgated and enforced by the authori-
ties." Id. at 14.
177. See ARNOLD R. WEBER, IN PURSUIT OF PRICE STABILITY: THE WAGE-PRICE FREEZE
OF 1971 1-9 (1973) (discussing 1971 wage-price freeze).
178. Any such proposal would face strong opposition from the business sector. See Pat-
rick S. McGurn, Executive Pay Draws Broad Criticism, ISS FRIDAY REPORT, May 30, 1997, at 3,
6-7 (citing survey of 400 executives finding that 90% oppose capping executive pay at a
fixed multiple of pay of lowest-paid employee); see also GALBRAITH, supra note 10, at 244
("The small number of people at the very top and the extreme disproportion of their access
to political power suggests that an overt move against the incomes of the executive class
would be extremely unlikely to succeed."). Given the significant opposition expressed by the
business community to the living wage movement, this is hardly surprising. See POLLIN &
LUCE supra note 141, at 2, 9-10 (discussing stiff business opposition to the living wage
movement).
179. Even if the "race to the bottom" theory of competition is overstated, competition
to attract corporations make it unlikely that any individual state or groups of states will jump
to be among the first to impose such a cap as a matter of state law. For a discussion of the
race to the bottom theory see William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
180. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(1) (1994). "In the case of any publicly held corporation, no
deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for applicable employee remuneration with
respect to any covered employee to the extent that the amount of such remuneration for
the taxable year with respect to such employee exceeds $1,000,000." Id. The $1 million limit
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both limits the deductibility of excess golden parachute payments
and imposes an excise tax in respect to them,lgl provide reason for
pessimism. In the case of section 280(G), there is evidence that not
only have many corporations foregone the deduction, but a num-
ber have also added a "gross up" to the compensation paid to
executives to take account of the tax imposed by section 280(G). In
other words, they increase the payment made by an amount equal
to the taxes that the executive will be required to pay.18 In the case
of section 162(m), many companies continue to pay executives in
excess of $1 million, even though such excess amounts are not de-
ductible 3 and those that do not exceed the cap drastically
increase the use of performance-based compensation that is ex-
empt from the limit.' As one scholar who has studied the situation
on deductibility is subject to a number of exceptions, including an exception for compensa-
tion that hinges on the "attainment of one or more performance goals." 26 U.S.C.
§ 162(m) (4) (c).
181. 26 U.S.C. §§ 280G, 4999. Under § 280G, a payment contingent on a change in
ownership or effective control of the corporation or in the ownership of a substantial por-
tion of the corporation's assets that provides an executive with payments greater than or
equal to three times the executive's total annual compensation is presumed excessive for tax
purposes. 26 U.S.C. § 280G(b) (2) (A).
182. Tate & Lyle PLC v. Staley Cont'l, Inc., No. CIV.A. 9813, 1988 WL 46064, at *2 (Del.
Ch. May 9, 1988) (discussing a gross-up with the effect of adding $13.8 million in cost to the
corporation); Brownstein & Panner, supra note 87, at 28, 34; Susan Lorde Martin, The Execu-
tive Compensation Problem, 98 DICK. L. REv. 237, 246 (1994) (noting that there is "no reason
to expect that corporations would be unwilling to forego the corporate deduction and in-
crease the payment to corporate officers to offset the excise tax"); Ellen E. Schultz, More-
Equal Benefits Go to Some Top Executives, WALL ST. J., May 25, 1992, at Cl (arguing that com-
panies will restore lost benefits when government puts limits on executive compensation);
Tax Gross-Ups Make Parachutes More Golden; Executive Compensation, AICPA J. ACCT., June 1,
1999, at 85 (citing study conducted by consulting firm William M. Mercer showing that
nearly two-thirds of companies with golden parachutes utilize gross-ups to compensate ex-
ecutives for tax exposure resulting from excess parachute payments).
183. See The Boss's Pay, WALL ST.J., Apr. 11, 1996, at R15 (according to a review of 1995
proxy statements by compensation consultants William M. Mercer, of 350 companies sur-
veyed, thirty-eight paid base salary in excess of $1 million); Michelle L. Johnson, Forget the
Rhetoric-Executive Pay Fell for Many in '91, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Mar. 13, 1992, at 8 (limit-
ing deduction for compensation will result in double hit to shareholders because companies
will opt to give up the tax deduction);Joann S. Luben, Firms Forfeit Tax Break to Pay Top Brass
$1 Million-Plus, WALL ST.J., Apr. 21, 1994, at BI (reporting that an examination of proxies of
ninety-one large companies by consultants Pearl Meyer and Partners, Inc. reveals that about
one-third of the companies have decided to pay what they want and do without the deduc-
tion rather than seek shareholder approval for certain pay plans or keep compensation at
the $1 million limit).
Companies are not hiding this fact. The proxy statements of many companies are quite
explicit that the company may pay compensation that may not be fully deductible because of
§ 162(m). See Scott P. Spector, The Compensation Committee Report, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULES § 4.4[4] [d], at 4-25 (2d ed., Aspen L. & Bus. Supp.
2000).
184. David Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Com-
patibility, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 440, 468 (2000) (noting that the "explosion of option grants"
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concluded, "there is little evidence that the deductibility cap has
had significant effects on overall executive compensation levels or
growth rates.',
8 5
Other tax approaches are no less susceptible to manipulation.
For example, if instead of focusing on the deduction side Congress
took the approach of imposing a prohibitive income tax rate on all
earnings over a certain multiple, corporations could provide ex-
ecutives with increased non-wage perquisites, including housing,
etc., thus making the attempt to regulate more complicated."7
The second problem is that a legally specified pay ratio is
unlikely to be perceived as fair. Part of the problem is that a Code-
imposed deductibility limit lacks flexibility. It imposes a one-size-
fits-all solution, suggesting that one pay ratio is appropriate regard-
less of factors such as industry, size and market, and, more
importantly, regardless of the contribution made by a CEO. It may
be that a higher multiple of rank and file pay is appropriate to
keep a superstar CEO who has been responsible for turning an ail-
ing company into a high performer and who is thinking of leaving
in favor of a more lucrative position elsewhere, than for an unin-
spired CEO of a sluggish company who has no other job
prospects. 18 And it may be that other factors peculiar to individual
since the passage of § 162(m) suggests that the "measure backfired (or was never intended
to work)"); Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code
to Influence CEO Compensation, (MIT Dept. of Econ. Working Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 00-24, 2000), at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=244570 (finding that companies keep
cash compensation around the $1 million range and concentrate growth in option grants
and other performance-based pay vehicles); see also Yablon, supra note 99, at 274-75 (argu-
ing for deduction cap that includes value of performance-based pay). As discussed below,
fair market value options are not really performance based because they reward for market
moves. See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
185. Rose & Wolfram, supra note 184, at 1; see also Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman,
The Taxation of Executive Compensation, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
7596, 2000), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7596 (finding that the $1 million limit led to
an increase in performance based compensation, but has not decreased total compensa-
tion). If anything, it has been suggested that § 162(m) has actually helped increase CEO pay.
Colvin, supra note 17, at 64.
186. James K. Galbraith terms a high progressive surtax on incomes more than a certain
ratio of rank and file pay an "inequality surcharge." GALBRAITH, supra note 10, at 244. He,
however, does not believe such a reform would succeed because of the political clout of the
highest paid. Id.
187. BOK, supra note 22, at 117 (noting that companies are likely to respond to manda-
tory ratios by compensating executives with perks that the government would need to review
to see if they should be classified as income).
188. See id. (finding that a mandatory ceiling on executive pay would drive talented ex-
ecutives to other lines of work); see also Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive
Compensation, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 713, 727 (1995).
It may also be that variations in firm characteristics require different types and levels of
incentives. See Harley E. Ryan & Roy A. Wiggins III, The Influence of Firm- and Manager-Specific
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
organizations will affect employees' views of fairness. The alterna-
tive to rigidity-creation of one or more exceptions that allow
modifications of the ratio imposed by the deductibility limit-is
ineffectiveness, as demonstrated by the experience with section
162(m) of the Code. Congress created so many exceptions to the
189$1 million cap on deductibility that executive pay noticeably in-
creased after adoption of the section.' 90 Such exceptions would
aggravate concerns about perceptions of unfairness.
b. Disclosure of Pay Ratios-Another approach would be for the
SEC to adopt a rule to force companies to disclose the ratio be-
tween the compensation of a company's executives and the pay of
• ~191 ..
its average employee and manager. This allows for two possibili-
ties. One is the possibility that disclosure itself will cause companies
to act differently. The second is the possibility that disclosure will
lead to an effort by shareholders to force change.
The first notion is that making that ratio "an accepted part of
the financial evaluation of the company by investors and potential
employees of the company, would introduce fair compensation
practicum to the Directors and Officers of the company.,9
Although it is true that disclosure of non-compensation related
matters, such as, for example, environmental disclosure, has had a
positive impact on many companies' consciousness of environ-
Characteristics on the Structure of Executive Compensation, 7 J. CORP. FIN. 101 (2000) (analyzing
influence of firm and managerial characteristics on executive pay).
189. The $1 million does not include commissions payable, amounts earned through
the attainment of certain performance goals, or remuneration payable pursuant to a con-
tract in effect on February 17, 1993. IRC § 162(m)(4) (B), (C), (D) (1994).
190. Stabile, supra note 11, at 89.
191. Cotton, supra note 124, at 157 (proposing SEC rule change to require disclosure of
compensation ratios).
192. Id. at 157-58, 178 (suggesting also that disclosure would "foster development of
what a reasonable compensation ratio should be and thus an industry standard"). Cotton's
belief in the efficacy of the disclosure approach is based in part on the notion that disclo-
sure would cause CEOs to face embarrassing and awkward questions from stockholders and
members of the financial press seeking justifications for the disparities that exist. Id. at 179,
182.
Embarrassment is a rather large factor among a group that considers itself to be as
special as this one does. The self-image of the executive class is such that to be caught
doing something that is clearly unfair or unwarranted and that may tarnish the image
is to be avoided at almost any cost.
Id. at 182; see also BOK, supra note 22, at 114 (arguing that more comprehensible disclosure
about executive compensation will help inhibit directors from rubber-stamping large execu-
tive salary increases, albeit erratically); David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach
to Corporate Social Responsiveness, 25J. CORP. L. 41, 45-47 (1999) (discussing disclosure as part
of reflexive law approach that requires a corporation "to reflect on how its practices impact
society").
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mental issues," 3 it is unlikely that merely disclosing compensation
ratios will lead to some action that will create a more reasonable
relationship between the pay of executives and rank and file work-
ers. The media attention devoted to the issue of executive pay,
including disclosure of the vast disparities in pay between executive
and rank and file workers, does not seem to have had any signifi-
cant effect on the level of executive pay. Rather, it has contributed
to the shift toward incentive pay, suggesting the public cares more
about how executive pay is determined than about the level of pay,
either in absolute terms or in relation to rank and file workers.
The second possibility is that disclosure of pay ratios will provide
an impetus for a shareholder action by providing information to
enable shareholders to lobby for changes in a company's compen-
sation structure. This is also likely to be unsuccessful.
It is true that the SEC enacted a major rules change about a
decade ago that both made executive compensation proxy disclo-
sure more understandable 94 and made it substantially easier for
shareholders to communicate with each other than in the past. 195
Those changes, combined with the fact that the SEC is now firmly
committed to the view that executive compensation is an
193. See Cotton, supra note 124, at 178-79.
194. See Executives Compensation Disclosure Rule Amendments, Securities Act Release
No. 6962 [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,056, at 83,414 (Oct. 16,
1992). More recently, the SEC enacted new amendments to its compensation disclosure that
enhance disclosure of equity compensation to executives, including a requirement that
companies provide separate tabular disclosure of equity compensation granted pursuant to
plans that are not approved by shareholders. See Disclosure of Equity Compensation Plan
Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 232, 232 (Jan. 2, 2002) (amending 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.201 and
228.601).
195. See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276,
48,276 (Oct. 22, 1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
Prior to 1992, anyone who wished to communicate with more than ten shareholders in a
manner calculated to influence a proxy voting decision was engaged in a solicitation and
therefore subject to the proxy rules, including the requirement to file a proxy statement.
Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, 57 Fed. Reg. at 48,276. Because it
could be found after the fact that a discussion among ten or more shareholders about cor-
porate issues was a communication intended to influence voting, shareholders were loathe
to communicate with each other out of fear they would be found to have violated the proxy
rules. Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, 57 Fed. Reg. at 48,278 (pream-
ble to rules); Douglas G. Smith, A Comparative Analysis of the Proxy Machinery in Germany,
Japan, and the United States: Implications for the Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 58
U. Pirr. L. REv. 145, 191 (1996) ("If ten shareholders or more merely discussed corporate
issues, they might be found to have engaged in a 'solicitation.' "). The rule changes, which
exempt any person, whether or not a shareholder, from all proxy requirements in connec-
tion with any written or oral communication ith shareholders if certain requirements are
met, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1) (2002), allow for communication among most share-
holders of public companies, with respect to issues of mutual interest and concern without
the mechanism of the proxy system being invoked.
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appropriate subject for a shareholder proxy proposal,1 9 improve
the ability of shareholders to use the proxy machinery as a way of
effecting change. "The theory is that institutional shareholders,
armed with the necessary data on pay and performance, can offer
counter-balancing power to top management by using the proxy
machinery to discipline and monitor the boards of directors."
197
However, there are always inherent difficulties in relying on
shareholder action to achieve any type of corporate change. Frag-
mented ownership of U.S. corporations, 98 compounded by the
196. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 168, at *2
(Jan. 28, 1997) (finding a proposal that no executive be compensated more than $1 million
per year, unless paid in accordance with a performance based plan approved by a majority
shareholder vote should be included in proxy); FPL Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 197, *3 (Feb. 12, 1996) (finding a proposal that compensation for
top executives be reduced to the total compensation for the year 1982 should be included in
proxy).
Prior to 1992, all shareholder proposals addressing compensation matters, including
those relating to compensation of senior executives and directors, were excluded as ordi-
nary business matters. This commitment was first expressed on February 13, 1992, when
then SEC Chairman Richard Breeden issued a statement indicating that because "the level
of public and shareholder concern over the issue of senior executive compensation had
become intense and widespread," shareholder proposals relating solely to compensation of
executive officers and directors must be included in a proxy statement. Statement of Rich-
ard C. Breeden on Executive Compensation Issues, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at
223 (Feb. 21, 1992)(quoting Chairman Richard Breeden). This was the same release in
which Breeden announced changes to the SEC's compensation disclosure rules. In the re-
lease, Breeden confirmed the SEC view that the appropriate amount of compensation
should be resolved in the private market place and that the SEC's role is to enhance the
workings of market forces by giving shareholders more relevant information about executive
compensation that is easier to understand and by permitting shareholders to make their
views about compensation known to the board of directors. Id.
197. Gregg A.Jarrell, An Overview of the Executive Compensation Debate, 5J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN. 76, 78 (1993).
198. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and
the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213,
222-25 (1999) (discussing effect of widely-dispersed shareholding on governance in contrast
to system of block ownership). Shareholders in the U.S. rarely own more than 1% of any
individual corporation's stock. MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS 6 (1994);
see also MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM: How MONEY MANAGERS ARE CHANGING
THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA 174 (1997) (describing common policy of institutional
investors of limiting individual holdings to 1-2% of the voting stock in any individual com-
pany). This is in contrast to other industrialized countries. Whereas none of the fifteen
largest U.S. corporations has a shareholder or related group of shareholders holding 20% of
its stock, in Japan, every large firm has a financial group holding an aggregate of 20% of its
stock. The German model is similar to that of Japan. ROE, supra, at 15; see also id. at 21-26
(discussing reasons for the fragmentation of U.S. share ownership, including American
public opinion, which mistrusted private large accumulations of power, and interest group
politics).
Even with a large stake, shareholders as a class may not be so concerned with prospects of
one investment because shareholders have multiple holdings, and their shares in one cor-
poration may prosper if shares of another of their investments fail. See Daniel R. Fischel, The
Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259, 1268 (1982) (giving as an example the
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collective action problem,"m makes reliance on the shareholder
proposal process for many issues dubious.
In particular, relying on shareholders to improve the plight of
rank and file workers has its own problems. After all, a shareholder
focus is a significant explanation for the rising inequality that exists
today. Shareholders have a narrow focus 2 0 0 and are also guilty of
viewing labor as merely a means of production, rather than a con-
stituency that ranks in importance with shareholders and
managers. Arguably, efforts to align executive pay with shareholder
interest through the use of incentive compensation schemes tend
to promote a shareholder-management alliance that leaves labor
out in the cold. Indeed, shareholders who do not blink an eyelash
at outlandish executive pay packages not only are not bothered by
stagnant rank and file pay, but also reward reports of layoffs.
Thus, notwithstanding some indications of shareholder interest in
202pay matters, it is not clear that shareholders as a whole can be
fact that when Braniff announced bankruptcy, shareholders of other airline companies who
inherited valuable routes prospered).
199. See ROE, supra note 198, at 6, 10 (stating that it is not worthwhile for shareholders
with small blocks to incur expenses of involvement); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The
Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'" 671, 676, 694-95 (1995) (describ-
ing shareholders as "rationally apathetic" because of lack of incentives to participate actively
in corporate decisionmaking and suggesting that overcoming problems of collective action
would be difficult and costly); Jayne w. Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate
Governance, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1135, 1149 (1991) ("[D]ispersed shareholders suffer from the
same problems of collective action as other politically disenfranchised people: (1) The cost
of individual action is high and unlikely to result in a commensurate reward, and (2) the
incentives toward collective action are inadequate."); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual
Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 3, 44 (1988) (noting
that in the absence of a cost-sharing mechanism, there is insufficient incentive for a single
shareholder, who can not capture the whole gain, to organize opposition).
200. Ralph Whitworth, executive director of United Shareholders Association, criticized
the Sabo bill discussed in note 174, supra, as "wrongheaded because it doesn't address the
central issue, which is pay for performance. It's not how much [executives] get paid, it's how
they get paid."Johnson, supra note 183, at 8.
201. See Edwin R. Render, How Would Tbday's Employees Fare in a Recession?, 4 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 37, 45 (2001) (noting that historically, the financial community viewed lay-
offs as a sign of weakness and improper management, whereas today, layoffs are taken as a
positive sign that management is willing to take steps to improve the bottom line); Al Lewis,
Panic Causing CEOs to Slash Workforces, DENY. POST, Apr. 1, 2001, at K1 (noting that CEOs cut
jobs when earnings decline to impress shareholders who want action); Ramon G. McLeod,
CEOs Being Rewarded for Dropping the Ax, Study Says Layoffs Bring Big Bucks, S.F. CHRON., May 1,
1997, at A8 (noting that boards design pay packages with effect of rewarding CEOs who lay
off workers).
202. Shareholders have submitted a number of proposals relating to executive pay,
however they are routinely defeated. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of
Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 1021, 1061 (1999). Share-
holders have been interested in compensation proposals that tie executive pay to
performance. See Lori B. Marino, Comment, Executive Compensation and the Misplaced
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relied on to address concerns about the gap between the pay of
203
executives and that of rank and file employees.
There is a subset of shareholders that shows more promise. Pro-
204 205fessor Marleen O'Connor, among other commentators, has
suggested an important role for organized labor as shareholder-
activists. She cites several examples of the use by labor of the
shareholder proposal process to attempt to ensure that executives
do not reap enormous financial benefits while workers are being
laid off or undercompensated . 6
This is an interesting use of labor power, and one that represents
an expansion of the industrial pluralism principle of collective
bargaining that saw "[t] he only proper role of the law in the work-
place [as] ... giv[ing] employees the right to organize, since
organization is a precondition to meaningful collective bargaining.
Once this is done, the law should allow employees and employers
to negotiate for themselves the terms and conditions of employ-
ment. " 20' Although in the past the traditional process of collective
bargaining has allowed unions to secure certain gains for workers,
.... 208particularly higher wages and greater job security, the traditional
Emphasis an Increasing Shareholder Access to the Proxy, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1205, 1214 (1999)
(citing research demonstrating that pay-for-performance shareholder proposals receive
more support than other proposals regarding executive compensation).
203. Several years ago, a shareholder proposal calling for BankBoston to cap CEO pay
by a multiple of the compensation of the lowest-paid BankBoston employee was defeated. See
BankBoston Corp.: Resolution to Restrict Pay of Chief Executive ReJected, WALL ST.J., Apr. 23, 1999,
at C 1.
Although institutional investors have displayed activism in other, less controversial areas,
they have not shown a concerted effort to tackle the issue of executive compensation. To the
contrary, with the exception of proposals trying to link pay to performance, institutional
investors have recently demonstrated their lack of support by instituting blanket-policies to
vote down shareholder proposals--specifically those dealing with executive pay. Lori B.
Marino, supra note 202, at 1233.
204. See O'Connor, supra note 46, at 1367-68 (reviewing labor's proposals from 1997
proxy season).
205. See Theresa Chilarducci, Labours Paradoxical Interests and the Evolution of Corporate
Governance, 24J.L. Soc'Y. 25 (1997); StewardJ. Schwab & Randall Thomas, Realigning Corpo-
rate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1018 (1998).
206. See O'Connor, supra note 46, at 1367-68.
207. Bales, supra note 49, at 692-93.
208. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and
the Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REv. 419 (1992) (arguing that
employers faced with union wage demands bargain to negotiate optimal contracts for wages
and employment). American unions, more so than their European counterparts, have fo-
cused their efforts primarily on securing higher wages and better working conditions, rather
than on a broader political agenda. See Hoyt N. Wheeler & John A. McClendon, Employment
Relations in the United States, in INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
63, 73-77 (Greg Bamber & Russel Lansbury eds., 3d ed. 1998).
Traditionally, unions have sought wage policies based on worker classification, with the
idea that workers in given classifications receive the same wages or wages that vary only
within a narrow band based on seniority, rather than promoting pay based on merit. Sharon
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process becomes less effective when there has been such a signifi-
209
cant decline in union density as in the U.S. private sector.
The new use of labor's power as shareholder has the potential to
magnify union influence. The best example may be the AFL-CIO's
efforts to coordinate pension fund holdings. "[T]he AFL-CIO has
started to use the Internet to promote a grass roots political
movement to encourage pension fund beneficiaries to communi-
cate to trustees about growing wage inequality and excessive
executive compensation. 10 Among other elements of its strategy,
the AFL-CIO has established Proxy Voting Guidelines that contain
its recommendations for how union trustees should vote on various
types of shareholder proposals, including proposals addressing ex-
ecutive compensation matters. 2 1 It then publishes a survey
disclosing whether investment managers managing union pension
funds vote in accordance with the guidelines on key shareholderS 212
resolutions. Its efforts, if successful, could create "one of the
largest blocks of organized shareholders in the United States.
Thus, the AFL-CIO's strategy to harness labor's pension power to
promote worker-shareholder interests has the promise of providing
unions with significant political influence in the world of corporate
,,213
governance.
These efforts have at least some potential for success. Pension
214funds hold a significant amount of shares in public companies,
and public pension funds, in particular, have been very activist,
particularly in sponsoring proxy proposals relating to aspects of
corporate governance. 2 1 5 As Professors Stewart Schwab and Randall
Rabin Margalioth, The Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism as a Cause for Labor's De-
cline, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133, 151 (1998); see also RICHARD B. FREEMAN, LABOR
MARKETS IN ACTION, ESSAYS IN EMPIRICAL ECONOMICS 203 (1989).
209. See sources cited supra note 49.
210. O'Connor, supra note 46, at 1351.
211. AFL-CIO, INVESTING IN OUR FUTURE: AFL-CIO PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES (on
file with author). With respect to executive compensation, one of the factors the guidelines
instruct a voting fiduciary to consider in evaluating proposed compensation plans is
"whether the compensation plan creates or exacerbates disparities in the workplace that
may adversely affect employee productivity and morale." Id. at 10.
212. CENTER FOR WORKING CAPITAL, 1998 KEY VOTES SURVEY (1999) (on file with au-
thor).
213. O'Connor, supra note 129, at 1.
214. ROE, supra note 198, at 21 (noting that pension funds hold approximately $3.4 tril-
lion of assets); Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 692 (citing estimates that pension funds will
own half of all corporate stock by the year 2000).
215. See Andrew K. Prevost& Ramesh P. Rao, Of Wat Value Are Shareholder Proposals Spon-
sored by Public Pension Funds ? 73J. Bus. 177, 179 (2000) (noting "proliferation of public fund
sponsored corporate governance shareholders proposals" and discussing reasons public
funds have been more activist than private pension funds); Sunil Wahal, Pension Fund
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Thomas have observed, these particular shareholders are less likely
than others to suffer from collective action difficulties; unions have
a greater incentive than other shareholders because their workers
are locked into a relationship with the employer.16 Moreover, in
addition to voting shares they own in the company in which the
union's employees work, it may be possible for unions to mobilize
other shareholders to act, especially if they can be persuaded that
the tremendous gap in pay between executives and rank and file
employees is harmful to the corporation.2"7 Thus, unions may be
able to promote adoption of shareholders proposals that would,
for example, impose a ratio (fixed or flexible) between the pay of
the CEO and pay of rank and file workers, or of a proposal that
would cap the amount of income a CEO could receive from stock
options.
In addition to direct voting of shares, unions' powers as share-
holders can be used to secure more representation on boards by
union representatives. Such representation is the norm in many
European countries, which have legally mandated board represen-
Activism and Firm Performance, 31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1, 2 (1996) (analyzing
proxy proposals put forward to public pension funds). Most of the corporate governance
proposals pushed by activist pension funds have not related to executive compensation.
Wahal, supra, at 9 (noting that 38 of 199 corporate governance related proposals in 1987-93
period related to compensation).
Although public funds have been most active, there is potential for activism by private
pension funds as well. In 1994, the Department of Labor issued a ruling that trustees must
vote shares under their control and must vote them in the "economic best interests of plan
participants and beneficiaries." Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Employment Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974, U.S. Department of Labor Interpretive Bulletin 94-2, 59
Fed. Reg. 38,860 (July 29, 1994) (codified at 29 C.ER. § 2059.94-2). This means that pension
fund trustees cannot vote passively with management, but must consider issues carefully. See
BLAIR, supra note 44, at 158.
The AFL-CIO attempts to ensure that trustees take theirjobs seriously. It issues proxy vot-
ing guidelines to inform plan trustees how labor views issues raised by shareholder proposals
and also conducts surveys to see if those managing union pension plans follow those guide-
lines. O'Connor, supra note 129, at 20.
216. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 205, at 1031.
217. Professor O'Connor gives the example of the California Public Employees' Re-
tirement System (CaPERS), which in 1997 initiated a "reverse Robin Hood" plan targeting
companies that combined downsizing and excessive executive compensation, based on its
belief that a company's human resources policies affect corporate performance. O'Connor,
supra note 46, at 1360.
Notwithstanding the CalPERs example, pension funds have thus far not focused very
much on the gap issue. For example, TIAA-CREF, a very activist pension fund, has a Policy
Statement on Corporate Governance that addresses a number of matters, including execu-
tive pay. Its five Fundamental Principles of Corporate Governance relating to pay matters do
not address the relation of CEO pay to that of rank and file workers. See TIAA-CREF Policy
Statement on Corporate Governance, reprinted in Max J. Schwartz & Scott P. Spector, Public Com-
pany Executive Compensation Issues, in HOT ISSUES IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 353 (PLI Tax
L. & Est. Planning Series, Course Handbook No.J-503, 2001).
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S218tation for large companies, but has been less widespread in the
United States. 29 Although there is some question regarding how
effectively union-nominated directors represent the interests of
220
employees, the compensation area is one in which there has
been some positive impact, with directors succeeding in modifying
proposals regarding executive compensation. 22' This conclusion is
supported by empirical findings of Professors Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan that the presence on boards of an active principal in the
form of a large shareholder results in CEOs being paid less for
222
"luck" and being charged more for their stock option grants.
Labor may have the ability to use its power to try to influence a
more fair pay ratio. However, no change in SEC disclosure rules is
required to mobilize that force. Labor is already fully aware of the
existing pay ratios, so it is not clear what SEC changes add to the
equation.
Indeed, SEC intervention here may hurt more than help. There
have already been instances where companies have complained
about labor use of the shareholder process to attempt to secure
benefits for labor versus shareholders as a whole. 22' These kinds of
complaints would expand dramatically if the SEC acted in a man-
ner that appeared to favor one group of shareholders over others.
In any event, in the final analysis, it is not clear how much suc-
cess labor can have here. As Professors Schwab and Thomas have
observed, "Without the support of other shareholders, the union
shareholder cannot change the company. These are not
218. In Germany, under the Mitbestimmung (Co-determination) Act of 1976, employ-
ees of corporations with over 2000 workers elect one-half of the supervisory board members.
Charles B. Craver, Mandatory Worker Participation Is Required in a Declining Union Environment
to Provide Employees with Meaningful Industrial Democracy, 66 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 135, 148-49
(1997). In smaller companies, employees elect one-third of the board members. Id. at 149.
Similarly, Dutch law mandates full works council participation for firms with 100 or more
employees and requires more limited council participation for companies with thirty-five to
ninety-nine employees. Id. at 151. In Sweden, under the Workers Directors Act (passed in
1972), employees who work for firms with more than twenty-five employees may select two
or three members of corporate boards of directors. Id. at 153.
219. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of Em-
ployees: Participatory Management and Natural Law, 43 VILL. L. Rav. 741, 795-97 (1998).
220. See Larry W. Hunter, Can Strategic Participation Be Institutionalized? Union Representa-
tion on American Corporate Boards, 51 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 557, 569-71 (1998) (suggesting
that except in certain cases, union representation does not result in effective representation
of worker interests).
221. See id. at 572-73.
222. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 57, at 207-08.
223. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Should Labor Be Allowed to Make Share-
holder Proposals ?, 73 WASH. L. REv. 41, 43 (1998) (discussing efforts by American Trucking to
exclude shareholder proposals by labor).
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worker-owned firms." 224 Thus, even if we are able to identify a de-
sired pay ratio, neither of the legal approaches discussed-
legislating pay ratios or mandating SEC disclosure of ratios-helps.
B. Seeking Greater Process Fairness
The discussion in subsection a suggests that, apart from difficul-
ties of achieving a desired pay ratio, it will be virtually impossible to
come up with an actual number that represents the desired ratio of
pay between executives and rank and file employees. We may have
an intuitive sense that some ratios between the amount paid to a
CEO and the amount paid to a company's lowest paid worker seem
acceptable-perhaps anywhere between 25:1 and 75:1-and a simi-
lar intuitive sense of ratios that we all agree are inexplicable, even
dangerous-perhaps those over 150:1. For some people, the unac-
ceptable ratio will be much lower. The difficulty of identifying an
appropriate ratio forces us to think in different terms.
We can greatly simplify the task if we acknowledge that in reality,
we are not so much looking for a particular number to be applied
to all companies in all circumstances, but rather for a sense that a
company, in any given situation, is doing the "right thing" by its
employees. I think in this context of the Goldman Sachs initial
public offering a few years ago, in which every one of the com-
pany's 13,000 employees, "from the secretarial pool in Tokyo to the
lower Manhattan trading floor,"2 2 5 received a generous stock
226grant. This is by no means a universal practice when a company/. 227
goes public. Goldman's formula for allocating approximately
21% of its IPO shares to employees involved giving employees an
amount of stock equal to about one-half their pay plus an amount
of bonus stock for each year of service with the company, 22 mean-
ing that even relatively low-paid employees received a meaningful
amount of stock. At the end of the first day of trading, the average
equity stake in the company of employees was around half a mil-
224. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 205, at 1023.
225. Thor Valdmanis, Goldman Employees Reap Bountiful Stake, USA TODAY, May 5, 1999,
at lB.
226. See id.; Joseph Kahn, Even a Tiny Slice of a Big Pie Tastes Rich, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 17,
1999, at Al.
227. See Kahn, supra note 226, at Al (reporting that Goldman is the first securities firm,
and one of the only firms in general, to share IPO stock with employees with no ownership
stake).
228. Id.; Erica Copulsky. Goldman Notifies Top Non-Partners of Payout Formulas, INv. DEAL-
ERS DIG., May 3, 1999, at 7.
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lion dollars. To be sure, Goldman executives took a much larger
piece of the pie, but there did not seem to be any sense that they
were getting rich at the expense of the company's lower-level em-
229ployees.
That means that what we are really trying to achieve, from the
point of view of both employee motivation and social policy, is an
allocation of reward among executives and rank and file employees
that is the product of a process that is both fair and that is per-
ceived as and trusted to be fair. We are not looking to eliminate pay
disparities, but to eliminate undeserved disparities. Implicit in that
may be the need to develop a different notion of employees, view-
ing them as important stakeholders in the company. If labor is
viewed merely as a cost, it is easy to think of workers merely in
market terms. However, if workers are viewed as important stake-
holders, like equity owners and managers, 230 we may have a
different view of what it means to be fair to them, and that view
may correspondingly contribute to a perception of fairness by em-
ployees. Harkening back to the discussion of the cause of the
widening gap in pay helps us to identify means to achieve greater
pay fairness in actuality and in perception.
1. Changing the Pay Composition of Rank and File Workers-As
noted earlier, one of the significant factors contributing to the in-
creasing gap between the pay of executives and that of rank and
file employees is the movement toward making contingent com-
pensation such a large part of the executive pay package.2 3 ' That
suggests that another possibility to consider is to change the pay
229. Kahn, supra note 226, at A3.
230. As Professor Kent Greenfield has observed:
To say that shareholders are the only 'owners' is to say that there is something inherent in
the act of contributing money to buy shares that distinguishes that act from the act of con-
tributing money to buy bonds issued by the company, contributing raw materials to be
refined by the company, or contributing labor to be used by the company.
Greenfield, supra note 3, at 1023; see also Thomas A. Kochan, Reconstructing America's Social
Contract in Employment: The Role of Policy, Institutions, and Practices, 75 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 137,
138 (1999) (discussing features of World War II social contract, which "included the expec-
tation that wages and earnings would rise in tandem with increasing productivity and
prosperity of employers .... With increased tenure at a firm came certain 'property rights'
to ajob.");Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611, 657 (1988)
(discussing view of workers as "part of the corporation, rather than factors of production or
hired hands"). There is legal support for such a view of employees in many states' constitu-
ency statutes, which permit boards to consider the interests of constituencies other than
shareholders (such as employees, creditors, the community, and customers) in making their
decisions. For a discussion of state constituency statutes, see Edward S. Adams & John H.
Matheson, A Statutory Model for Coiporate Constituency Concerns, 49 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1086-89
(2000).
231. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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composition of rank and file workers to resemble more closely that
of executives. Pay for performance here is not quite a surrogate
for attempting to come up with a fair ratio of executive to rank and
file pay because decisions still need to be made regarding the
amount of incentive compensation to provide. However, it does
make the effort to create a perception of fairness easier.2 3  A heav-
ier use of incentive compensation for rank and file employees may
also help curb manipulation of such compensation because execu-
tives will need to choose between manipulating their pay and not
that of rank and file employees-making the manipulation more
transparent by the difference in treatment-or of manipulating
across the board, drastically increasing the cost to the company of
such actions.
I earlier suggested two possible reasons that stock compensation
has historically been reserved for CEOs and other senior execu-
tives-concern about whether stock compensation can successfully
motivate rank and file employees, who may not perceive a clear
link between their actions and a company's stock price, and con-
cern about the ability of rank and file employees to bear a risk of
loss if the company does not perform well. The first of these is not
a reason for not changing rank and file pay composition. The sec-
ond, however, is a cause for concern.
Our goal here is to create a reasonable relationship between
CEO and rank and file pay because of our conviction that a more
reasonable relationship is desirable. That being the case, the ar-
gument that stock compensation may not positively impact
employee motivation is less relevant than if one were arguing for
234incentive pay on other grounds. The argument here is simplythat using more stock to compensate rank and file employees will
232. Alternatively, one could take the position that stock-based compensation should be
less heavily used for executives. Professor Marleen O'Connor, for example, argues for the
elimination of executive stock options on the ground that "managers need to balance the
interests of all of the firm's stakeholders and stock options bind them too tightly to share-
holders." O'Connor, supra note 129, at 19.
233. In a sense, we are doing the same thing with rank and file workers that has made
people comfortable with incentive pay for executives. As one commentator has noted, focus-
ing on the relationship between pay for performance "avoid[s] having to ask courts,
compensation committees, or anyone else to answer the difficult questions of how much
compensation was reasonable for a CEO, or whether the process by which compensation was
set was fair." Yablon, supra note 99, at 280.
234. Obviously it would be relevant if increased stock compensation had the effect of
decreasing motivation. I have not heard anyone make that argument. However, it is conceiv-
able that if a large enough piece of an employee's compensation were paid in the form of
stock, a free rider problem could occur in the sense that individual employees may feel that
the effort of others will be sufficient to move the employer's stock price in a positive direc-
tion, imposing little cost on their own shirking.
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cause their compensation to better mirror (although at a lower
level) movements in executive compensation. If we are convinced
of the value of attaining more appropriate pay ratios, we should be
willing to take this action without regard to questions about the
motivational impact of stock on rank and file employees.
Even if one accepts the relevance of the question of the extent
to which incentive pay will motivate rank and file workers, it is not
clear that concern is warranted. One of the arguments employers
make for the importance of allowing employees to invest 401 (k)
money in company stock is the value of such stockholdings in
promoting employee loyalty and productivity,235 suggesting that
employers think stockholding by employees is valuable. Addition-
ally, a recent study evaluating the effect of broad-based employee
stock option plans on corporate performance found that compa-
nies with broad-based stock option plans have significantly higher
productivity than all public companies as a whole as well as higher
236productivity than their peer companies. There is also evidence
that share ownership by a broad range of employees has a positive
impact on reducing absenteeism 217 and helps in employee reten-
tion 238
Risk of loss, however, is a legitimate concern. Employees already
have their current job security tied to the financial prospects of
their employer. In addition, many employees have a significant
235. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Report on Employer Stock in 401(k) Plans 3 (Feb.
28, 2002), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/401 (k).pdf (discussing
employer beliefs regarding value of employee holdings of company stock).
236. See Joseph Blasi et al., Broad-Based Stock Options and Company Performance: What the
Research Tells Us, in STOCK OPTIONS, CORPORATE PERFORMANCE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL
CHANGE 14 (Joseph Blasi et al. eds., 2000) (finding 38% higher productivity than all public
companies and 37% higher than peer group); see alsoJohn Core & Wayne Guay, Stock Option
Plans for Non-Executive Employees, 61 J. FIN. ECON. 253, 257 (2001) (noting that although
lower-level employees may not influence stock price through individual action, grant of
stock options "potentially induces mutual monitoring and thereby improves group incen-
tives"). But see Joseph Blasi et al., Employee Stock Ownership and Corporate Performance Among
Public Companies, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 60, 64 (1996) (discussing prior studies of
broad-based employee stock ownership, finding that "[p ] rior studies of a variety of forms of
employee ownership have yielded divergent results, leading to no overall conclusion as to
whether these plans have better or worse performance" and coming to no different conclu-
sion based on their own data set); Charles D. Ittner et al., The Structure and Performance
Consequences of Equity Grants to Employees of New Economy Firms 30 (Jan.
2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (reporting study findings that grants to
lower level employees are not positively associated with increases in shareholder value).
237. See Sarah Brown et al., Absenteeism and Employee Sharing: An Empirical Analysis Based
on French Panel Data, 1981-1991, 52 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 234, 247 (1999) (finding 7-15%
reduction in absenteeism).
238. See James Hale, Strategic Rewards: Keeping Your Best Talent from Walking Out the Door,
14 COMP. & BENEFITS MGMT. 39 (1998).
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amount of their retirement savings in the form of company stock
in a 401 (k) plan.2 9 Therefore, paying a greater portion of employ-
ees' compensation in stock or stock options runs the risk of further
nondiversifying their portfolios. That will be a particular concern
240to employees in a sluggish market.
One response to that concern is to keep employees' base salary
where it is and provide stock compensation as an additional ele-
ment of compensation. After all, executives receive quite sizableS 241
base salaries in addition to their contingent compensation. How-
ever, if the effect of paying rank and file employees more like
executives is simply to increase compensation across the board,
there may be undesirable inflationary effects.
Another reason to hesitate before encouraging companies to in-
crease the amount of stock compensation to rank and file
employees is that while the evidence cited above suggests there are
positive effects of encouraging employee stock ownership, there
may also be some negative effects. It has been suggested that em-
ployees who hold significant amounts of company stock may be less
likely to raise objections to corporate misbehavior out of fear that
242doing so will adversely affect stock price. There is also some evi-
dence indicating that performance-based pay may have negative
effects on worker safety; that is, for some workers ressure to pro-
duce more may result in more workplace injuries.
2. Accounting Changes-The second suggestion for improving
fairness is also based on the fact that one of the heavy contributors
to the growing disparity in pay between executives and rank and
file workers has been incentive compensation, particularly stock
239. Theo Francis, Company Stock Fills Many Retirement Plans Despite the Potential Risk to
Employees, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2001, at C1 (reporting the results of a study of the Institute
of Management and Administration finding that the 401 (k) plan assets in one in five com-
panies is at least 50% invested in company stock); Richard A. Oppel,Jr., TheDanger in a One-
Basket Nest Egg Prompts a Call to Limit Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2001, at CI (noting that
among plans permitting investment in company stock, 32% of plan assets are invested in
that option and that in situations where the employer mandates that matching contributions
be made in company stock, more than 50% of plan assets are so invested).
240. See Susan Pulliam, New Dot-Com Mantra: just Pay Me in Cash, Please, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 28, 2000, at C1 (noting that many rank and file employees who were previously enthu-
siastic about stock compensation are pressuring internet companies to increase the amount
of their cash compensation because of the declining value of shares).
241. I have previously argued that the base salaries of senior executives are so high that
it distorts the incentive effect of performance-based compensation. See Stabile, supra note
94, at 260-62.
242. SeeJeffrey L. Seglin, Do Stock Options Buy Silence?, N.Y. TIMES, February 17, 2002, § 3,
at 4.
243. See Michelle Kaminski, Unintended Consequences: Organizational Practices and Their
Impact on Workplace Safety and Productivity, 6 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 127, 134
(2001) (finding performance-based pay to be related to a higher injury rate).
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options-the most prevalent form of incentive compensation.244
Options are most frequently granted with an exercise price equal
to the fair market value of the employer's stock on the date of
grant. 245 From an incentive point of view, this is problematic; an
executive granted a large number of options does not have to do
246
very much to reap a large return on the grant.
The excesses of option compensation could be curbed if com-
panies granted performance or indexed options, that is, options
where the exercise price is tied to some measure of company per-
formance or to an external index. 247 This would prevent executives
from receiving a windfall based on small market-driven stock
movements. Although some companies have engaged in this type
244. See sources cited supra note 73.
245. See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options,
112 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 209, 209 (2000) (noting that 94% of options granted to CEOs of
S&P 500 companies in 1998 were granted at fair market value); Barbara Buell, Executives
Time Key Announcements to Maximize Stock-Option Values, Study Finds, STAN. ONLINE REP., Aug.
11, 1999, at http://www.stanford.edu/dept/news/report/news/augustl I/stockoptions-
728.html (noting that stock options are nearly always granted with an exercise price equal to
the stock price on the date of the award).
246. See Clawson & Klein, supra note 100, at 32 (arguing that fair market value options
give the executive "the benefit of all the appreciation of the company's underlying stock
rather than limiting the benefit to merely the stock price appreciation that is directly re-
lated" to the executive's performance); Stabile, supra note 94, at 264-65 (arguing that fair
market value options do not set a high enough performance hurdle and reward executives
even when company performs less well than the market as a whole); Jennifer Reingold, An
Options Plan Your CEO Hates, Bus. WK., Feb. 28, 2000, at 82 ("In today's options-obsessed
corporate climate, it doesn't take much for executives to rake in the millions. With seven-
figure grants now commonplace, big bucks go to anyone who can get his stock to inch above
the exercise price."). Of course, there is no downside to the executive; if stock price does
not rise, the executive simply does not exercise her option. But see Brian J. Hall & Kevin J.
Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Pa-
per No. 8052, 2000), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8052.
247. See Clawson & Klein, supra note 100, at 32 (arguing that in order to achieve trte
performance-based pay, option exercise price should be indexed to appreciation of com-
pany's stock relative to appreciation of stock of the company's peers); Shane A. Johnson &
Yisong S. Tian, Indexed Executive Stock Options, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 35 (2000) (discussing incen-
tive implications of indexed options). There are other alternative pricing mechanisms that
would improve the incentive effect over fair market value grants, including granting pre-
mium options. See Shane A. Johnson & Yisang S. Tiang, The Value and Incentive Effect of
Nontraditional Executive Stock Option Plans, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000) (comparing incentive
effects of several nontraditionally priced stock options).
Merely tying the exercise price to some measure of performance is not sufficient. What-
ever the model, it is necessary to ensure that the performance hurdle is high enough. See
Cynthia J. Campbell & Charles E. Wasley, Stock-Based Incentive Contracts and Managerial Per-
fornmance: The Case of Ralston Purina Company, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 195 (1999) (analyzing Ralston
Purina's 1986 incentive plan, which granted options that vested only if stock reached a cer-
tain level within 10 years and concluding that the fact that hurdle could be expected to be
reached easily within the 10 years meant that the payoff was not tied to value creation and
did not align the interests of shareholders and managers).
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of option pricing, 4s grant date fair market pricing is still the most
common.
One disincentive to companies engaging in more incentive-
based option pricing is their desire to avoid triggering adverse ac-
counting consequences. Under current accounting principles, so
long as options are granted with an exercise price that is at least
equal to the fair market value of the shares subject to the grant, no
compensation expense needs to be recognized with respect to the
options.24 9 Essentially, options are costless from an accounting• 250
point of view, making them the only type of compensation that
generate an expense that is deductible for tax purposes251 but that
252does not have to be expensed for financial accounting purposes.
248. See FRying High, supra note 66, § 3, at 1 (giving Transamerica, Monsanto, and Bank-
America as examples of companies who have granted options with exercise prices at greater
than fair market value on the date of grant); Shawn Tully, Raising the Bar, FORTUNE, June 8,
1998, at 272, 276 (noting Colgate-Palmolive and Ecolab as examples of companies granting
premium priced options to their CEOs).
249. See ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK ISSUED TO -EMPLOYEES, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
BOARD OPINION No. 25, 10 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1972) [hereinafter APB
OPINION No. 25]. No need for compensation expense occurs because 10.5(b) specifies
that the measurement date for determining compensation costs in stock option plans is the
first date on which are known both the number of shares that an individual is entitled to
receive and the option price. Thus, the compensation expense is zero for an option granted
with an option price equal to the grant date fair market value of the shares.
250. Because options generally involve no compensation expense, they are sometimes
referred to as "stealth compensation." See Draft Bill Seeks Options'Expensing in Return for Favor-
able Tax Treatment, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 338 (Mar. 14, 1997) [hereinafter
Draft Bill]; see also Executive Compensation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tax'n of the S. Comm.
on Fin., 102nd Cong. 7-15 (1992) (statement of Sen. Levin).
Options are not completely costless. As with all stock compensation, they carry a cost to
shareholders in terms of dilution. In addition to the direct cost to shareholders from the
dilution, recent empirical work demonstrates that companies respond to the dilutive effect
of significant option exercises by diverting money that would otherwise be spent on value-
enhancing investments toward the repurchase of their own stock and that the effect of this
diversion is a decline in company performance. Daniel A. Bens et al., Real Investment Implica-
tions of Employee Stock Option Exercises, 39J. ACCT. RES. (forthcoming 2002).
251. An employer receives a deduction equal to the amount of ordinary income re-
quired to be recognized by an employee in connection with the exercise of an option. 26
U.S.C. § 83 (1994).
252. To give a sense of the constraint that might be imposed if companies had to ex-
pense options, accounting for the cost of stock options would have reduced the 1996
reported earnings of MCI Commmunications by 5% and would have completely wiped out
all of Netscape's 1997 earnings. Roger Lowenstein, Coming Clean on Company Stock Options,
WALL ST.J.,June 26, 1997, at Cl.
Options also have favorable accounting in another respect. The Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) recently announced a change to the basic earnings-per-share calcu-
lation. When a company calculates its earnings per share, it need not adjust the number of
shares for options that are outstanding and in the money. Therefore, not only is the grant of
options "costless" from an accounting point of view, but the large number of outstanding
options in the hands of executives has no impact on earnings per share. See Elizabeth Mac-
Donald, FASB Rules to Lift Firms'Per-Share Net, WALL ST.J., Mar. 14, 1997, atA3.
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Although the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
considered amending its rules to require that companies recognize
an expense in connection with options granted, 2t responded to
.... 254
the immense opposition it received by adopting a much more
limited rule that gave companies the choice of either expensing
options based on fair market value or providing footnote disclo-
sure of the cost of options granted.255
Thus, a company granting an option at a fixed option price has
no accounting charge. However, under the current rules, if a com-
pany chooses to grant a performance option, it will incur a
253. In April of 1993, the FASB voted to issue new rules that immediately would require
increased disclosure of stock option compensation and that beginning on January 1, 1997,
would require the recognition of an expense for stock options. FASB Approves Stock Compensa-
tion Rules, but Postpones Effective Date on Expense, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 515
(Apr. 9, 1993) [hereinafter FASB Approves].
254. A number of arguments were voiced by corporate leaders during the hearings held
by the FASB. Among the positions expressed were that options have no such value, and if
they do, that value can not be fairly measured. Additionally, representatives of high technol-
ogy firms expressed the concern that expense recognition prevents them from being able to
offer stock-based compensation. See FASB Abandons Bid to Require Expensing of Employee Stock
Options, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1725 (Dec. 23, 1994) [hereinafter Abandons
Bid].
Opposition to the FASB proposal was not limited to corporate leaders. At the time it was
initially announced, then Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentson expressed "reservations" about
the proposal, suggesting that increased disclosure was more appropriate than requiring
companies to take a "highly debatable" earnings charge when granting options. See FASB
Approves, supra note 253, at 515. Nor was Bentson alone in terms of government opposition.
One FASB member implied that the introduction of several bills in Congress, including one
that would have given the SEC veto power over the FASB's rulemaking was part of the rea-
son for the FASB's backing off its proposal. See Abandons Bid, supra, at 1725. The Senate was
not monolithic on this issue. In June 1993, Senator Lieberman introduced the Equity Ex-
pansion Act, a bill that opposed the FASB proposal, while Senator Levin introduced two bills
which would have mandated inclusion of stock options as expenses. See Draft Bill, supra note
250, at 338.
255. ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AC-
COUNTING STANDARDS No. 123 at 16-44 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1995).
Statement 123 encourages companies to accrue a compensation expense over the period of
an employee's service for the increase in the value of options granted based on the fair mar-
ket value of the stock. Such accrual is not required if a company makes specified
supplemental disclosure about the options. The FASB has recently indicated that it may
revisit its decision not to require expensing of stock options, and that it hopes to come to
some decision during the first quarter of 2003.
The SEC decided several years ago that it would not interfere in the accounting issue.
The SEC position on disclosure and accounting issues was expressed in a speech of then
Chairman Roberts on May 20, 1992. Essentially, he said that the SEC cares only about the
disclosure of compensation and not the amount of compensation, that the valuation of
options creates difficult issues, and that the SEC should defer to the FASB on accounting for
stock options. Richard Y. Roberts, Executive Compensation: The Stock Option Dilemma,
Remarks at WESFACCA Afternoon with the SEC (May 20, 1992) (transcript available from
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Committee).
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charge. 56 Although it might seem that for large companies, the
accounting charge would have a relatively small impact, many
companies simply do not want to recognize the accounting ex-
pense, thus, creating a disincentive to the use of indexed
options.
In order to eliminate the disincentive to companies to grant in-
dexed options, it is necessary to change the accounting rules so
that companies are forced to recognize an accounting expense
upon granting of options, a suggestion I have made before25 and
259
one that has been made by a number of commentators and con-
260gresspersons.
In addition to allowing for better option pricing, charging an
accounting expense for options granted can contribute to narrow-
ing the executive-rank and file pay gap in another way. The
absence of a compensation charge in connection with the granting
of options means boards feel unconstrained in the number of op-
tions they grant. If companies were forced to recognize a
compensation charge, boards would be constrained from granting
too many options for fear of adversely affecting corporate earn-
ings.2
6 1
256. Under current accounting rules, if a company granted performance options,
where the number of shares or the exercise price is contingent upon future performance,
the measurement date does not occur at grant, with the result that an accounting charge
would occur at the time the number of options and the price became fixed. APB OPINION
25, supra note 249, 10 (noting that a measurement date may be later than the date of
grant and may depend on events occurring after grant award date).
257. Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REv.
1901, 1908-11 (2001) (contrasting accounting treatment of fixed versus indexed options as
explanation for why companies shy away from indexed or other variable priced options).
258. See Stabile, supra note 94, at 278.
259. See Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensa-
tion: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 795, 812 (1995) (noting debate
over forcing companies to estimate present value of outstanding options against current
earnings in financials); Geoffrey Colvin, How to Pay the CEO Right, FORTUNE, Apr. 6, 1992, at
60 (referring to Graef Crystal's examination of CEO option gains compared to performance
of company stock and suggesting the failure to charge options in financial statements is part
of the problem); Thomas A. Stewart, The Trouble with Stock Options, FORTUNE,Jan. 1, 1990, at
93 (current accounting treatment of options obscures their costs).
260. On February 13, 2002, Senators McCain, Levin, Fitzgerald, and Durbin introduced
legislation to require companies to deduct the estimated cost of stock options granted from
profits in order to be permitted to take a tax deduction available upon option exercise.
Ending the Double Standard for Stock Options Act, S. 1940, 107th Cong. (2002); David
Leonhardt, Pressure for Overhaul Builds on Stock Options, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2002, at C8 (de-
scribing bill). Senators Levin and McCain proposed similar legislation in 1997, but there was
insufficient support to pass it.
261. See Michael A. Hiltzik, Taking Stock of CEO Pay, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1996, at Al
(quoting Graef Crystal to the effect that "[i]f there was a charge to earnings from option
grants these boards would know they were playing with live ammunition."). According to
calculations of the London advisory firm of Smithers & Co., if the 100 largest U.S. compa-
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Although eliminating the Accounting Principles Board's Opin-
ion No. 25 (APB 25) is a necessary first step, it is not sufficient on
its own. The accounting change alone may be enough to force
boards to be more cognizant of the number of options they grant
to senior executives, but it would not necessarily affect the price at
which those options will be granted. Forcing companies to recog-
nize an accounting expense for all options it grants merely permits
more flexible option pricing, it does not guarantee that boards
dominated by CEOs will actually take advantage of that ability. Nor,
even if they do, does it guarantee that the performance hurdles
established would be high enough to be meaningful.262
Additionally, the elimination of APB 25 may be a double edged
sword in that it may make it easier for companies to engage in the
kind of practices that defeat pay for performance and inflate ex-
263
ecutive pay, such as option repricing. Thus, it may be that more
direct action, in terms of encouraging indexed options and disal-
lowing reloads and repricing needs to be considered. Regarding
this last suggestion, this is a place where shareholder action has
more possibility of effecting positive behavior. As the earlier discus-
sion of shareholder action suggested, shareholders have shown
interest in some questions regarding executive compensation, par-
ticularly those related to incentive compensation.H Thus, actions
like making it easier for shareholders to have proposals relating to
issues such as requiring shareholder approval for option repricing
nies had recognized a charge to their income statements for their stock compensation, prof-
its in 1995 would have been 30% lower than reported and profits for 1996 would have been
36% lower. Tice, supra note 77, 13 (noting also that in 1998, stock option compensation
amounted to 13.2% of the outstanding shares for all U.S. public companies). That is a result
many boards would seek to avoid.
262. See supra note 247 (second paragraph).
263. There is good reason to suspect this might be the case. In 2000, the accounting
standards were changed to require less favorable accounting treatment for options repriced
after Dec. 15, 1998. See INTERPRETATION No. 44, 1 25 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd.
2000). The result of that change has been a reduction in option repricing. See NATIONAL
CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, CURRENT PRACTICES IN STOCK OPTION PLAN DESIGN
(2000) (finding a decrease in option repricing from 1998 to 2000); Stuart L. Gillian, Option-
Based Compensation: Panacea or Pandora's Box? 23 (TIAA-CREF Inst., Working Papers, 2001),
at http://www.tiaa-crefinstitute.org/publications/wkpapers/wp4-05-01.htm (noting likeli-
hood of less frequent repricing because of FASB pronouncement). That suggests that if
companies had to recognize an accounting charge upon initial option grants, they would
have less reason to fear negative accounting consequences from repricings. On the other
hand, there is also evidence that companies are already using other ways to get the same
effect as repricing without the adverse accounting consequences. See id, (describing recission
and issuance of replacement options).
264. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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placed on proxy statements may prove helpful in the effort to curb
abuse of incentive compensation.
CONCLUSION
In 1898, Samuel Gompers defined a living wage as a wage "suffi-
cient to maintain an average-sized family in a manner consistent
with whatever the contemporary local civilization recognizes as in-
dispensable to physical and mental health, or as required by the
rational self-respect of human beings."265 Many people in America
do not earn a living wage. But to phrase the question in the most
generous terms, so long as employees are being paid a living wage,
should we ignore vast disparities between their pay and that of
CEOs and other senior executive officers?
From an economic point of view, one could argue that pay ratios
are meaningless, claiming that the markets for executives and rank
and file employees are quite different ones and that they should be
allowed to function freely. Laments that executive pay is soaring
while rank and file employees are being laid off may tug at heart-
strings, but it is difficult, despite popular belief,266 to demonstrate a
strong and direct link between amounts paid to corporate execu-
tives and downsizing decisions, many of which are merely the
inevitable result of the modern industrial revolution or an efficientS267
and necessary response to excess capacity. Sometimes downsizing
is a result of a company adjusting to decreased demand for its
268products; in other cases, it represents a shift to outside suppliers,
265. LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, A LIVING WAGE 3 (1997) (quoting statement of AFL
president Gompers during an 1898 debate).
266. SeeJill Dutt, Study Shows Anger over Executives'Pay, NEWSDAY, July 1, 1992, at 42 (cit-
ing study indicating that Americans believe excessive executive compensation is the main
reason for the loss of American jobs in the last ten years).
267. As one commentator observed, "Technological and other developments that began
in the mid-twentieth century have culminated in the past two decades in ... rapidly improv-
ing productivity, the creation of overcapacity and, consequently, the requirements for exit."
Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control
Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 833 (1993). In his Article, Jensen discusses how factors such as
changes in physical and management technology, global competition, regulation, and taxes
have generated excess capacity, and consequently, the need for downsizings. See id. at 835-
47.
268. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 188, at 718-25 (downsizing is an efficient and neces-
sary response to excess capacity); Marty Whitford, Round Two: Yokohama Enacting More
Layoffs, RUBBER & PLASTIC NEWS, Sept. 30, 1996, at 8 (discussing layoffs at Yokohama Tire
Corp. resulting from the company's ongoing plan to adjust inventory and production levels
to meet slower market conditions).
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which are a less costly way of providing goods and services. 6 9 Nor is
there persuasive support for claims that differences in pay ratios
between American executives and rank and file employees on the
one hand, and foreign executives and rank and file employees on
the other, adversely affect the competitiveness of American com-
270panies.
However, there are clearly reasons to be concerned about the
gap. Even if the only ground for the debate was an economic one,
it is possible to make a convincing case that productivity declines as
a result of the negative impact of the disparity on the motivation of
rank and file employees.
I do not, however, accept that the only legitimate ground for this
debate is an economic one. From the point of view of social policy,
we should not find such vast pay disparities in pay to be acceptable.
Not only are the disparities inconsistent with our notion of dis-
tributive justice, but we should be gravely concerned with the type
of society we are creating when we allow this level of inequality.
The more difficult question is how to obtain a more reasonable
relationship between the compensation paid to executives and the
pay received by rank and file employees. One possibility is to de-
termine an acceptable pay multiple and then seek a means of
achieving it. However, it is difficult to get beyond the broadest of
notions of what are or are not acceptable ratios. Even assuming we
could, it would be no easy task to achieve that more acceptable pay
ratio, despite evidence of labor mobilization in attacking corporate
decisions it does not believe to be in the best interest of employees.
269. See THUROW, supra note 39, at 27. Indeed, the market response to announcements
of downsizing suggest a belief among investors that downsizing has positive effects, enabling
a company to reduce payroll costs, thus freeing revenues for reinvestment in the corpora-
tion or for payment of dividends to shareholders. For example, when AT&T announced at
the end of 1995 that it planned to downsize by 40,000 employees, its stock rose $2.625 to
$67.375, a 4% increase. See Randall Smith & Steven Lipin, Are Companies Using Restructuring
Costs to Fudge the Figures, WALL ST. J.,Jan. 30, 1996, at Al.
270. Although amounts paid to executives sound large in absolute terms, these amounts
generally represent a very small percentage of the assets or sales of the companies paying
them-too small to have any meaningful effect on product prices. See HACKER, supra note
108, at 114 (stating that compensation paid to top executives comprises a very small item in
total company costs); Detlev Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Market or the
Courts?, 8J. CORP. L. 231, 238 (1983) (giving as an example a car corporation with sales of
eight billion dollars a year that pays its president $500,000 in excess compensation; the ex-
cess amounts to only 1/16,000th of total sales, which would not increase the price of a car by
more than $0.25). Thus, change in compensation policy are unlikely to have any real impact
on competitiveness. See Lauren Belsie, Executives Make Hay, but the Sun Is Not Shining, CHRIS-
TIAN ScI. MONITOR, Feb. 13, 1992, at 8 (noting that compensation experts agree that
reducing executive pay will not have a direct impact on U.S. competitiveness).
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A more promising alternative may be to focus on the fairness of
the pay-setting process. Recognizing the cause of the widening gap
in pay as CEO dominated boards combined with the increased use
of incentive compensation, I have suggested that we focus our at-
tention there. One suggestion is to consider paying rank and file
workers more like executives in terms of the components of their
pay, an approach that creates some greater risk to employees. More
promisingly, I suggest ways we might eliminate the worst of the
abuses in the use of incentive pay. Although the steps I have put
forth for consideration may not represent a complete solution to
the problem, they focus the reform spotlight at the root of the
problem.
